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For the past century, the Supreme Court has been unable to articulate a
consistent state action doctrine. The Court has often struggled to blend new

approaches to the state action problem with the sometimes inconsistent earlier
holdings. Often, these attempts have only further muddied the waters of state
action theory. However, rather than search for some underlying mythical theoretical consistency to explain the state action decisions, these cases can more
appropriately be understood by examining changes in the relative importance
which the Court had attributed to either of two objectives which underlie the
state action doctrine: federalism and satisfaction of public expectations.
The first objective, federalism, is a "recognition that there are areas of
private rights upon which federal power should not lay a heavy hand and which
should properly be left to the more precise instruments of local authority.",
The second objective is the satisfaction of reasonable public expectations that
certain activities, partly because of their nature, will be performed in a constitutional fashion. The proper scope of such expectations arises from balancing
the liberty interests of the individual defendant to act arbitrarily and capriciously, free from governmental interference, with the equality and due process
rights of the aggrieved plaintiff. With the possible exception of Justice Harlan's
3
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases2 and Justice Black's opinion in Marsh v. Alabama,
satisfaction of public expectations is not an objective which has been discussed
explicitly in the state action case law. However, careful scrutiny of the various
opinions justifiably leads to the conclusion that the decisions during the Vinson
and Warren eras implicitly recognized the role and importance of fulfilling public
expectations in ascertaining the proper contours of any state action doctrine.
This recognition is absent from the Court's earliest state action decisions as
well as the more recent Burger Court decisions. Although the Burger Court
has not expressly discounted public expectations, implicitly it has clearly done
so. On the other hand, references to federalism concerns have more often been
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. A.B., 1972, Michigan; J.D.,
Boston College.
1. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963).
109 U.S. 3, 58 (1883) (Harlan J., dissenting).
2.
3. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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direct and are more clearly identifiable.' Whether implicitly or explicitly, the
relative importance that the Court has attributed at different periods of time
to these two very different doctrinal objectives accounts in large measure for
the varying scope of the state action concept.
This article will analyze the state action decisions in light of the impact that
varying judicial concerns for federalism and public expectations have had upon
the concept of state action. This approach eliminates the need to effectuate an
impossible theoretical reconciliation among the major state action decisions. This
article will examine the various doctrinal "tests" the Court has articulated.
Despite the Court's purported adherence to its own precedent, these various
state action formulations demonstrate major doctrinal shifts. When the decisions
are viewed in light of these two doctrinal objectives, a clearly discernible pattern
of doctrinal expansion and contraction emerges. The contours of this pattern
are in large part directly attributable to the change in the Court's paramount
concern from federalism to satisfaction of public expectations and then back
again to federalism.
The state action concept of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, with
its underlying focus on federalism principles, was very limited. During the
Vinson and Warren Court era, this paramount concern for federalism gave
way, to a great extent, to fulfilling public expectations. The result was an
expansive state action concept during this period. The shift in doctrinal objective, combined with certain other socio-political phenomena, explains the dramatic expansion in the state action concept in the twentieth century, particularly
in the period between the 1940's and the 1970's. This shift also accounts for
the corresponding departure from the more restrictive language of the Court
in the nineteenth century. However, under the Burger Court the pendulum
has swung back to a narrow concept of state action. Yet the Court's failure
or unwillingness to overrule the prior expansive state action decisions has resulted in some awkward decisional inconsistencies."
Thus, while state action is admittedly a "conceptual disaster area,''6 an
historical perspective of the decisions, focusing on the alternating predominance
of doctrinal objectives, provides a framework for understanding these decisions.
Such an understanding is essential for charting the Court's anticipated future
course. Moreover, an historical perspective of the state action decisions is also
useful because it allows identification and evaluation of at least three sociopolitical phenomena that help explain the waxing and waning scope of state
action over the past century.

4. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963).
5. For a novel alternative approach to the state action question that is posed by the state's
delegation to a private entity of the performance of the state's own statutorily mandated obligations,
see Schneider, The 1982 State Action 7'ilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and a Proposalfor Change,
60 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1150 (1985).
6. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Fortard: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's Propositions 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
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STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW -

SOCIO-PoLITICAL FACTORS

Prior to World War II, state action was limited essentially to action taken
by formal governmental actors. 7 The state could act only through its legislature,

executive, or judiciary. 8 Private conduct in this period was subject to little, if
any, governmental interference, making the division between private and public
9

action fairly clear.
At least three socio-political phenomena help explain the expansion of the
state action concept from the 1940's through the early 1970's. First, the coming
of the twentieth century saw the rise of the powerful private entity, capable of
exerting the coercive power that had previously been associated only with the
0

As the power wielded by these groups more closely approximated
that of the state, it became reasonable to make these groups subject to the
same limitations that applied to the state power. Any state involvement with
sovereign.'

these private entities lent additional force to their ability to deprive weaker
individuals of their rights."

7. See Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U.LJ.
683, 685-89 (1984). Constitutional restrictions were applied during this period to actions of courts,
administrative agencies, municipalities, a state university, and a prosecutor. Id. at 688. This limitation of action taken by formal governmental actors began to change, at least by the time of the
Court's decisions in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Teny v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953). In these latter cases, the Court's language began to reveal a change toward recognizing
actions of private entitites as state action in certain circumstances. See infra text accompanying notes
74-102; cf. Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1296, 1329 (1982) (formalistic approach to state action would apply fourteenth amendment only to state officials acting directly against the complaining party).
8. "It is doubtless true that a State may act through its different agencies, - either by its
legislative, its executive or its judicial authorities; and the prohibitions of the [fourteenth] amendment
extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one
of these agencies or by another." Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879). "A State acts by
its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way." Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
9. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1425-28
(1982); Phillips, supra note 7, at 724 n.211, 726 n.214 (arguing that the public-private blurring
that occurred in the post-World War II period might better explain the incoherence rather than
expansion of the state action concept).
10. Horwitz, supra note 9, at 1428; Phillips, supra note 7 at 726-28, 726 n.215.
Private power began to become increasingly indistinguishable from public power precisely at the moment, late in the nineteenth century, when large-scale corporate concentration became the norm. The attack on the public/private distinction was the result of a
widespread perception that so-called private institutions were acquiring coercive power that
had formerly been reserved to governments.
Horwitz, supra note 9, at 1428.
11. But see Phillips, supra note 7, at 727-28.
Taken by itself, though, the rise of group power may not have been a significant factor
in the extension of governmental action. It is difficult to identify many expansionary state
action doctrines using group power and its effect on the individual as an explicit basis for
the expansion; it also is difficult to identify doctrines that find application mainly or
exclusively in cases in which group power is evident. The obvious exception, however, is
the public function doctrine. When employing this doctrine, the Court has mainly focused
on formally private actors and their attributes in isolation from their ties to the political
state. As Marsh v. Alabama and Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
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Second, the unintrusive government of the nineteenth century'- underwent
a dramatic transformation in the second half of the twentieth century with the
emergence of the activist welfare state. This development occurred partly in
response to the rise of the large institutionalized private entity and to a perceived
need to regulate it."' The new pervasiveness of governmental influence blurred
the once easily discernible boundaries between public and private conduct because governmental regulation now intertwined actions of the state with those
of private entities." The activist government's impact on the expansion of the
state action concept is reflected in those decisions that focused on the connections
between the state and the formal private actor in the form of regulation, funding, licensing, and the granting of monopoly status."
Third, during the post World War II era, the Court became increasingly
concerned with the protection of certain "civil rights," namely personal freedom
from racial discrimination." Thus, the great expansion in the concept of state
action from the 1940's until the 1970's has often been explained by the connection between the state action question and the equal protection claims made
by blacks.' 7 The Court sought to provide the lower federal courts with a tool

Plaza reveal, the Court's preoccupation with the private actor's functional resemblance to
formal government units is characterizable as a surrogate for its concern over the practical
power the actor exerts.
Id. at 728 (footnotes omitted).
12. [Plrivate law came to be understood as a neutral system for facilitating voluntary
market transactions and vindicating injuries to private rights. The hostility to statutes
expressed by nineteenth century judges and legal thinkers reflected the view that state
regulation of private relations was a dangerous and unnatural public intrusion into a system
based on private rights.
Horwitz, supra note 9, at 1426.
13. Governmental activism in the form of regulations also came at the behest of private
interests. See Phillips, supra note 7, at 728 n.231, 729-30. "The contemporary erosion of the public/
private distinction in many areas of legal doctrine described by Professor Stone is but another
symptom of the passing of that world of nineteenth-century decentralized competitive capitalism
that once made that distinction a rough approximation of reality." Horwitz, supra note 9, at 1428.
14. Phillips, supra note 7, at 729-30.
15. Id. See also McCoy, Current State Action Theories, The Jackson Nexus Requirement, and Employee
Discharges by Semi-Public and State-Aided Institutions, 31 VAND. L. REV. 785, 803 (1978); Note, State
Action Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 66077, 685-90 (1974).
16. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); and
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), are all cases involving race discrimination which predate the end of World War II. See infra text accompanying notes 48-86.
17. See, e.g., Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra - Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1289 (1982); McCoy, supra note 15, at 789-90 (while acknowledging this phenomenon, maintains
that the restriction in the state action concept is best explained not by the absence of the race
factor but by a shift from claims brought by outside consumers of the actions of the private entity
to claims brought by the entity's employees). At least one commentator, however, has asserted that
the state action inquiry is a threshold issue, rendering the nature of the underlying constitutional
violation irrelevant. Leedes, State Action Limitations on Courts and Congressional Power, 60 N.C. L.
REV. 747, 750-51, 754 (1982). But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-61, 1170
(1978) (arguing that the merits and the weight to be given to the constitutional right involved
should also be considered and therefore rejecting the idea that state action is merely a threshold
question). See also L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 246-66, 421-29 (1985).
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to alleviate the devastating impact of racial discrimination. To achieve this goal,
the Court expanded the range of private activity that would be viewed as state
action and subject to judicial scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. The
Court's aversion to racial discrimination made it unsympathetic to the private
actor's interest in freedom of choice and less sensitive to principles of federalism."8
The absence of means other than the fourteenth amendment to attack racial
injustice compounded the need to expand the state action doctrine. The Court's
dependence on the fourteenth amendment lessened, however, as Congress passed
new civil rights statutes 9 and the judiciary resurrected old civil rights statutes,
all of which prohibited private racial discrimination. 21' These statutory remedies
provided broader and more certain protection than the fourteenth amendment
with its nebulous state action requirement.2' Moreover, the remedy offered by
some of the new legislative enactments, such as the threat of monetary cutoffs, 2 2 often made racial discrimination less appealing to the private entity. This
eliminated some of the more egregious economic consequences of private discrimination.
The expansive approach to state action, which was acceptable in the context
of racial discrimination, was not as desirable in subsequent cases where race
was not a factor. 23 These non-race state action cases began to proliferate and
replace the racial discrimination cases. As a result, the need for an expansive
state action definition subsequently dwindled and the Burger Court became less
inclined to meddle in the affairs of private parties.
Another explanation of the expansion of state action during the Vinson and
Warren eras focuses on the relationship between the aggrieved party and the
private entity. Cases during this period of expansive state action involved claims
of constitutional deprivation generally based on equal protection grounds and
brought by outside "consumers" of the private entity's action.24 In contrast,
18.

See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Although Marsh did not involve racial

discriminations, the court nevertheless was concerned with an extremely important constitutional
right, namely that of the first amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 121-53.
19. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered
sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.).
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969);
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); see Leedes, supra note 17, at

747.
21.

"Thus, only those individuals not protected by the statutory prohibitions now buil[t] their

claims for relief on the shifting sands of fourteenth amendment state action theory." McCoy, supra

note 15, at 790 n.25.
22. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000d (1964); Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 5 1001 I; see also Leedes, supra note 17; McCoy,
supra note 15.
23. It has been asserted that it is necessary to have more connection between the state and
the private sector in order to meet the state action requirement when claims alleging deprivation
of due process are made than when ones alleging denial of equal protection are made. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Inc., 419 U.S. 345, 365 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Friendly,
supra note 17.
24. McCoy, supra note 15, at 790.
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the later Burger Court cases involved due process claims asserted by employees
of the private entities.2 ' However, the state's involvement with these private
entities was not intended to benefit the employees of such entities. Rather, state
aid to and regulation of the private entity was designed to benefit the "consumers" of the services provided by these private entities. Therefore, the Court
refused to find state action in the more recent cases involving suits by employees
because the state involvement with the private entity was not connected with
the private entity's action vis-a-vis its employees. This last rationale finds support in the language of one of the Court's most recent decisions, Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn.2 6 In that case, the Court emphasized that the state action argument
failed, partly because the claim of alleged constitutional deprivation was made
by employees of the defendant, an ostensibly private school providing statutorily
mandated special education, rather than the students, the intended beneficiaries
27
of the state's statutory scheme.
The Burger Court's return to a narrow definition of state action thus parallels a change in the nature of the right allegedly deprived by the challenged
activity of the ostensibly private party, as well as a change in the type of person
bringing that challenge. The state action cases brought before the Court evolved
from equal protection claims involving race discrimination to equal protection
and due process claims in which race was not a factor. The claims have changed
from those brought by outside consumers to those brought by 'employees' of
the private entity.
One more observation is useful in mapping out and explaining the changing
scope of the state action concept. The Court's nineteenth century and early
twentieth century decisions required some direct action by a governmental actor
in order to establish state action. By the mid-twentieth century, directness was
no longer a judicially imposed prerequisite. However, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 2 8 the only decision of the Court's most recent pronouncements on the
subject which actually found state action, appears to indicate a return to this
restriction.

25. Id. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) is an obvious exception.
See infra text accompanying notes 225-42.
26. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
27. Id. at 841; see infra text accompanying notes 287-90; see also Milonas v. Williams, 691
F.2d 931, 940 (10th Cir. 1982), cet. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). Milonas involved a section 1983
suit by former students against a private residential school for youths with various behavioral
problems. Many of the students were placed at the school involuntarily by juvenile courts and
other state agencies acting alone or with the consent of the parents. There was significant state
funding of tuition as well as extensive state regulation of the educational program. While acknowledging that the school involved in Rendell-Baker was quite similar to the one involved in the present
case, the court held that Rendell-Baker was not controlling since it had only dealt with the state
action question with regard to discharged employees, not students. The Tenth Circuit cited the
First Circuit's observation in Rendell-Baker that students "would have a stronger argument than do
[employee] plaintiffs that the school's action toward them is taken 'under color of' state law, since
the school derives its authority over them from the state." 691 F.2d at 940 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Baker v. Kohn 641 F.2d 14, 26 (1981)); see infra notes 288 and 289.
28. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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In view of those reasons proffered to explain the state action expansion
under the Vinson and Warren Courts, one must naturally ask what triggered
the retreat of the Burger Court. Two related explanations have already been
offered, namely changes in both the types of claims of alleged deprivation and
in the type of claimant. But perhaps more significant than either of these is
the re-emergence of a strong judicial concern for federalism, with a corresponding reduction in the importance of fulfilling public expectations. 29 To test the
soundness of such an explanation, an analysis of contemporary state action
doctrine must begin by looking at the Court's discussion of federalism concerns
in its first major state action decision.
II.

THE CASE LAW

A.

Nineteenth Century

The opinions of Justices Bradley and Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases contain
the earliest definitive statements of the policies underlying the state action doctrine. This occurred even though these cases actually concerned the power of
Congress to enforce the fourteenth amendment, rather than the precise scope
of federal judicial power.' ° At issue in the Civil Rights Cases was whether the
enactment of sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 exceeded Congress' power under the civil war amendments.3' These sections made it unlawful
to deny to "any citizen, . . . regardless of race, color or previous condition of

29.

See Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Publid/Private Distinctions Matter, 130 U.
cf. J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1978-1979 (1979); Powell, The CompleteJeffersonian:Justice Rehnquist and Federalism,
91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982). Dean Choper has characterized the state action doctrine as "an interesting
topic because it is on the topic of state action that one can find the clearest area of conservatism
on the part of the Burger Court and the most unqualified reversal of position from that adhered
to by the Burger Court's predecessor." J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra, at 265.
30. 109 U.S. at 10-12. Nevertheless, "the Court's discussion of 'state action' remains the
classic exposition of the doctrine." W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1151 (5th ed. 1980). The present extent of congressional enforcement under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is not the subject of this article. I note, however, that this congressional power
may be greater than the power of the court. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1043-44 (10th ed. 1980); McCoy, supra note 15, at 748.
31. "Has Congress constitutional power to make such a law? Of course, no one will contend
that the power to pass it was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last three
amendments." 109 U.S. at 10. The Court also held that, under the thirteenth amendment Congress
was vested with the power to "pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and
incidents of slavery in the United States." Id. at 20. However, it determined that the denial of
accommodations in inns, 'theatres, and public conveyances was not a badge nor an incident of
slavery, because it was not a necessary incident of slavery such as compulsory servitude, restraint
of movement, and disability to hold property, to make contacts, etc. Therefore, mere denial of
accommodations had nothing to do with slavery. Rather, it was a matter of social rights, and since
free blacks were often denied accommodations before the adoption of the thirteenth amendment,
ex-slaves should not fare any better. In short, even though Congress had the power to enact direct,
as opposed to corrective, legislation under the thirteenth amendment, it could do so only to eradicate
slavery and the badges and incidents thereof. The proper remedy for these plaintiffs, according to
the Court, was to be found in state courts under state law. Id. at 25-26.
PA. L. REV. 1441 (1982);
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servitude" the "full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres
and other places of public amusement." t' 2 The Court held both of these sections
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment.
Two principles emerged from Justice Bradley's majority opinion. First, the
fourteenth amendment prohibited only action taken directly by the state. Second,
proscribing any other action would violate the concept of federalism. Justice
Harlan's dissent, on the other hand, did not focus on the literal text of the
amendment, but on congressional intent in drafting the fourteenth amendment
and public perceptions regarding the types of conduct attributable to state action.
The contrast between these two opinions set the stage for the ongoing competition between protecting federalism by limiting those areas of activity which
would be subject to scrutiny by the federal judiciary and fulfilling reasonable
public expectations that certain types of conduct should be subject to constitutional limitations.
Justice Bradley began his analysis by holding that section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment only granted Congress the power to pass laws to enforce the prohibitions of section 1 of that amendment."' Therefore, the scope of these prohibitions was central to the Court's decision. Only state action that abridged
the privileges and immunities of citizens or deprived persons of due process or
equal protection of the law was prohibited. ' 4 Individual invasion of individual
rights was not the subject matter of the amendment."' Justice Bradley asserted
that an individual was constitutionally incapable of depriving other individuals
of their civil rights unless the wrongdoer acted under "state authority."'" His
language leaves little doubt that only the acts of those acting directly for the
state would be recognized as state action by the Court. Thus, the Court concluded that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment only provided "modes of
redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers

32. Id at 9.
33. Id. at 11-15. The fifth section of the amendment
provide(s) modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State
officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified
in the amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . by way of prohibition against State laws and State proceedings affecting
those rights and privileges. ...
Id. at 11.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights, such as are guaranteed by
the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of
individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or
executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights
of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under State authority,
his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws
of the State for redress.
Id. at 17.
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executive or judicial," when
these infringed upon the rights specified in the
37
amendment's first section.

The Bradley opinion also evidenced a clear concern for safeguarding the
principles of federalism. The opinion emphatically stated that section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment "does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon
subjects which are within the domain of State legislation.' '3: Nor did it "authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private
rights" 3 9 since that would "make Congress take the place of the State legislatures
and to supersede them.'"'4 The problem with the civil rights law then under
''4
judicial scrutiny was that "it steps into the domain of local jurisprudence. 1
Thus, Justice Bradley concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was a prohibition of private conduct for which Congress had no authority to enact legislation.
Justice Harlan's eloquent and emotional dissent took a more expansive view
of state action than the majority by focusing on the "publicness ' 42 of the

37. Id. at 11. Justice Bradley's view was consistent with that of Justice Strong in Ex parte
Virginia who wrote: "A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can
act in no other way." 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
38. 109 U.S. at 11. Because the Civil Rights Act sections were characterized as direct, rather
than correct legislation, the law was held unconstitutional.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 13.
41. Id. at 14. Additionally, Justice Bradley wrote that to interpret section 5 any differently
could violate the tenth amendment. Id. at 15.
[T]he implication of a power to legislate in this manner is based upon the assumption
that if the States are forbidden to legislate or act in a particular way on a particular
subject, and power is conferred upon Congress to enforce the prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate generally upon that subject, and not merely power to provide
modes of redress against such State legislation or action.
Id. at 14-15.
42. Id. at 58 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346-47). First,
with regard to public conveyances on land and water, Justice Harlan pointed to prior cases that
had held that common carriers were involved in the exercis6 of a public office with public duties
to perform. Id. at 37. These cases had gone so far as to support the idea that making and
maintaining highways for the public was a function of the government and that railroads, for
example, were in effect public highways established and regulated by the state. Id. at 37-38.
Railroads were agents of the state; therefore, the function they performed was that of the state.
Id. at 8. Furthermore, private corporations that owned them were subject to state coercion if they
did not discharge their duty to the public. Id. at 39. Justice Harlan went so far as to characterize
the right to use a public highway or conveyance as a fundamental right. Id. Second, with regard
to inns, Justice Harlan asserted that the term as used in the Civil Rights Act had the same meaning
that it did in common law. Id. at 40. The innkeeper's employment was "quasi-public," which
charged him with certain duties and responsibilities to the public. Id. at 41. Among these duties,
according to Justice Harlan, was one not to discriminate against potential guests on the basis of
race or color. Id. Finally, Justice Harlan addressed places of public amusement. These, he wrote,
were "clothed with a public interest" because they were "used in a manner to make them of
public consequence and to affect the community at large." Id. at 42. Indeed, these places were
established and maintained by the authority of the public in the form of licenses granted by the
states or local governments. Id. at 41. This discussion appears in the portion of Justice Harlan's
dissent in which he analyzed the Civil Rights Act under the thirteenth amendment. However, later
in the opinion he wrote:
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challenged actions, even though they were taken by individuals. Justice Harlan
concluded that "practical enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment""* required that the individuals who were objects of the Civil Rights Act be deemed
"agents or instrumentalities of the State because they are charged with duties
to the public and are amenable, in respect of their duties and functions, to
governmental regulation." 44 He argued that the rights of white citizens at common law and those arising from the public nature of the activities covered by
the Civil Rights Act under scrutiny were to be enjoyed by black citizens as
well. He premised this conclusion on the idea of reasonable public expectations
based on the public nature of certain activities. That public nature imposed a
duty on those who performed such activities to provide the service involved in
a certain way." Implicit in the imposition of these duties was the concomitant
expectation that they would be discharged properly. 46 Reasonable expectations
arose with regard to activities that were sovereign in nature.
Justice Harlan also argued that the framers of the fourteenth amendment
knew that equal enjoyment of citizens' rights was endangered not only by direct
actions of the state, but also by hostile actions of private actors. Therefore, he
contended that it was reasonable to presume that section 5 of the amendment
was intended to enforce the prohibitions of section 1 against these private entities. 47 This is the first indication that something less than direct action by the
state could sustain a finding of state action.
B.

The Twentieth Century Expansion

After the Civil Rights Cases, the Court subsequently found state action in
each of the four White Primar , Cases, decided between 1926 and 1953. 4' All four
cases involved racial discrimination in the primary electoral process in Texas.

It remains now to consider these cases with reference to the power Congress has possessed
since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Much that has been said as to the
power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment is applicable to this branch of the
discussion, and will not be repeated.
Id. at 43. This portion of his thirteenth amendment discussion was premised on the disparate
treatment of blacks in public places. This is clearly cognizable under the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause, and, therefore, a state action concern as well.
43. Id. at 58.
44. Id. at 58-59.
45. Note that none of the activity characterized as public or quasi-public was either exclusively
provided by the state or provided solely by the particular defendants involved. See Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1978) (discussion of public function test); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-59 (1974) (discussion of public function test); infra text
accompanying notes 225-75.
46. Black citizens, from a practical point of view, may not have shared those expectations
because of the prevalence of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, legally, all citizens entitled to
protection under the constitution were legally entitled to share such expectations. It is the latter
type of expectation that Justice Harlan's opinion addressed.

47.

109 U.S. at 54.

48.

Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon

v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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These opinions evidence varying concern for public expectations and federalism
in determining the state action question.
At least the first two of these cases, Nixon v. Herndon4 and Nixon v. Condon, '
were still prisoners to Justice Bradley's language in the Civil Rights Cases." Both
cases, either by express acknowledgment or by implication, constantly referred
to the necessity of direct action by some formal organ of government, be it
the legislature, the executive or the judiciary.52 In Herndon,5', the judges of
elections, following the express provisions of a Texas statute, had refused to
allow the black plaintiff to vote in a Democratic primary. 54 The Court held the
statutory exclusion to be a "direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth
[Amendment]"-" and therefore considered it unnecessary to determine whether
the statute was also unconstitutional under the fifteenth amendment.5" The Court's
state action analysis was perfunctory because the Court found it "too clear for
extended argument that color cannot be made the basis of a statutory classi57
fication affecting the right set up in this class."
Six years later in Condon, the same plaintiff again brought suit against the
election judges because they had, as before, refused to permit him to vote in
the Democratic primary.58 1 The resolution was passed under a statute that had
been enacted to substitute for the one declared unconstitutional in Herndon.""
This new statute allowed political parties to limit their membership.6"
This case provided the Court with its first real opportunity to expand the
narrow scope of state action articulated in the Civil Rights Cases. Unlike Herndon,
in which the decision to allow racial discrimination was made directly by the
legislature, Condon involved a decision to discriminate made by private individuals, the Democratic Party Executive Committee. The Court firsf reasoned
that the executive committee would not have had the power to prescribe membership qualifications if the state had not conferred that authority upon it."'
Therefore, the members of the committee were acting as delegates of the state
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

273 U.S. 536 (1927).
286 U.S. 73 (1932).
109 U.S. 3 (1883); see supra text accompanying notes 33-41.
109 U.S. at 3.
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
"[T]he denial was based upon a Statute of Texas enacted in May, 1923, and designated

Article 3093a, by the words of which 'in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a
democratic party primary election held in the State of Texas'.
Id. at 540.

55. Id. at 541.
56. Id. at 540.
57. Id. at 541.
58.

286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Whatever inherent power a State political party has to determine the content of its
membership resides in the State convention.... The State Executive Committee, if it is
the sovereign organ of the party, is not such by virtue of any powers inherent in its
being.... To this committee the statute here in controversy has attempted to confide
authority to determine of its own motion the requisites of party membership and in so
doing to speak for the party as a whole.
Id. at 84-85.
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when they adopted the discriminatory resolution rather than simply as delegates
of the Democratic party 2 The opinion's language indicated that the Court still
required a direct causal relationship between the state and the discrimination
in order to find state action."" The Court, therefore, characterized the executive
committee as an "organ of the [sjtate"' 4 with respect to the power delegated
to it by the legislature. It left open, however, the question of whether parties
or their committees could be considered organs of the state in other circumstances."'
This linkage between the state and the committee was relatively easy to
justify in Condon because the committee was performing a governmental type
function by determining voter qualifications in the primary electoral process.
The Condon Court acknowledged that the committee had acted "in matters of
high public interest."',', The public could justifiably expect that all activities
bearing upon the "capacity of government to exercise its functions""' would
be carried out within the strictures of the Constitution." Thus, the Court created
an embryonic public function doctrine,"' as a means, at least in part, of accommodating those public expectations.
The four dissenting justices in Condon emphasized their concern for safeguarding federalism.'" The dissenters found no direct action by the state. They
disagreed with the majority's premise that the power exercised by the executive
committee, namely prescribing membership qualifications, was derived from the
Texas statute. Instead, they maintained that the executive committee had the
inherent power to take such action." The statute only reflected the state's intent

62. "[T~he statute lodged the power in a committee, which excluded the petitioner and others
of his race, not by virtue of any authority delegated by the party, but by virtue of an authority
originating or supposed to originate in the mandate of the law." Id. at 84. "Whatever power of
exclusion has been exercised by the members of the committee has come to them, therefore, not
as the delegates of the party, but as the delegates of the State." Id. at 85.
63. "Power so intrenched is statutory, not inherent. If the State had not conferred it, there
would be hardly color of right to give a basis for its exercise." Id. at 85.
64. Id. at 88.
65. Id. at 88-89.
66. Id. at 88.

67.

Id.

68. The pith of the matter i, simply this, that when those agencies are invested with
an authority independent of the will of the association in whose name they undertake to
speak, they become to that extent the organs of the State itself, the repositories of official
power. They are then the governmental instruments whereby parties are organized and
regulated to the end that government itself may be established or continued. What they
do in that relation, they must do in submission to the mandates of equality and liberty
that bind officials everywhere.

Id.
69. See infra text at notes 123-40; 162-77; 241-69; 290. Under this theory, a private party
performing a public function would be subject to the same constitutional limitations as the state
itself would be were it actually performing the function.
70. Justice McReynolds wrote the dissenting opinion. Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, and
Butler joined him. 286 U.S. at 89 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
71. This inherent power of the executive committee had long been recognized by the courts
and legislature of Texas:
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to refrain from interfering with the activities of political parties.7 2 Advocating
a position of non-interference for the federal courts, the dissent concluded that
no substantial reason justified negating the state's effort to return control of
party membership to private political parties. 73 That such a position was advocated only by dissenters indicated that federalism was beginning to lose its
hegemony as an objective in ascertaining the proper scope of state action.
Twelve years later in Smith v. Allwright, 74 the Court held that exclusion of
a black from the Democratic primary election, under a resolution passed by
the Democratic state convention, constituted state action in violation of the
fifteenth amendment. 75 In so holding, the Court overruled Grovey v. Townsend,,'
which had been decided only nine years earlier. Grovey had held that the Democratic state convention's determination of membership qualifications by excluding blacks was purely private action. 77 The Smith Court explained its
A political party is a voluntary association, and as such has the inherent power to prescribe
the qualifications of its members. The act of 1927 was not needed to confer such power;
it merely recognized a power that already existed. Waples v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5; 184
S.W. 180; White v. Lubbock (Tes. Civ. App.) 30 S.W. 2d 722; Grigsby v. Harris, 27
F.2d 942.
Id. at 93 (quoting the circuit court of appeals, 49 F.2d 1012, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1931), see also 286
U.S. at 96-104.
72. It must be inferred from the provisions in her statutes and from the opinions of her
courts that the State of Texas has intended to leave political parties free to determine who
shall be admitted to membership and privileges, provided that none shall be excluded for
reasons which are definitely stated and that the prescribed rules in respect of primaries
shall be observed in order to secure official recognition of nominees therein for entry upon
the ballots intended for use at general elections.
By the enactment now questioned the Legislature refrained from interference with the
essential liberty of party associations and recognized their general power to define membership therein.
286 U.S. at 104-05.
73. Id. at 105-06. The dissent's position rested on the requirement of direct state action by
the State, just as the majority's position did. See id. at 94.
74. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
75. The fifteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend XV.

The suit in Smith was brought under 8 U.S.C. §§ 31 and 43 (section 43 became 42 U.S.C.
1983). It was a suit for damages against precinct election and associate election judges for refusing
to give the plaintiff, a black, a ballot. 321 U.S. at 650-51.
76. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
77. The Grovey holding exemplified the contrast the Court saw between the action of a party's
state convention and that of its executive committee at that time. The Court's holding in Condon
had been premised on the idea that the executive committee lacked the power to determine party
membership qualifications to the exclusion of blacks because the party's state convention had not
expressed such a policy. See supra text accompanying notes 61-69. Three years later in Grovey, the
action of a party through its state convention was similarly viewed as purely private conduct. 295
U.S. at 53. In Smith, the Court was presented with a situation much like Crovey, and expressly
overruled it. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 666.

5
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overruling of Grovey by pointing to United States v. Classic,7" which had held that
the Constitution allowed Congress to regulate primary elections when the law
made them an integral part of the election process." ' In Grovey, the Democratic
party's denial of a vote was merely a denial of party membership." The Court
in Smith, relying on its holding in Classic, recognized that the denial of party
membership was, in effect, the denial of the right to vote in a primary. Moreover, the right to vote in such a primary without state discrimination was
secured by the fifteenth amendment."'
The Court's language reveals that, although it still required some direct
action by the formal organs of government, the Court was now willing to
venture a small step beyond the strict state action doctrine of the Civil Rights
Cases. The Court had recognized that in a single factual situation several different alternative analytical formulations might be used in approaching the state
action issue. First, the Court mentioned that when the state delegated to a
private party authority to prescribe the qualifications for participation in primary
elections, the private party's actions became the actions of the state.8" This
action again foreshadowed the development of a public function test for determining state action. Second, the Court reviewed the statutory scheme for selecting party nominees and concluded that a party required to follow these
legislative directives became an agency of the state with regard to its role in
determining nominees."' Third, the Court noted that Texas required candidates
to pay the cost of the primary, while other states, such as Louisiana, paid the
cost themselves.8 The Court concluded that, "[w]hether paid directly by the
state or through state requirements, it is state action which compels."' Finally,
in a formulation most unlike the state action doctrine of the Civil Rights Cases,
the Court concluded that Texas had endorsed, adopted and enforced the party's
discriminatory conduct. The state had prescribed that the general election ballot
be composed of party nominees chosen in primaries, and had entrusted the
Democratic party with the task of determining the qualification of participants
in those primaries. " ,
The use of varying analytical frameworks to examine the state action question continued in Terry v. Adams,87 in which there were three opinions finding
state action, none of which commanded the majority of the Court. 8 The case
involved the exclusion of blacks from voting in primary elections by the Jaybird

78. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
79. 321 U.S. at 659-69 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U S. at 316-18).
80. 321 U.S. at 659.
81.
Id. at 660-62.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 660.
84. Id. at 662-63.
85. Id. at 664.
86. Id.
87. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
88. Id. at 462 (Black, J., plurality opinion); id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion);
id. at 477 (Clark, J., plurality opinion).
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Since 1889,
Democratic Association, a Texas county political organization.'
when these primaries began, the candidates nominated ran unopposed in the
DemQcratic primaries and usually won in the general elections." All but one
member of the Court found the exclusion from the Jaybird primary to be state
action in violation of the fifteenth amendmentY'
The first ground supporting a finding of state action in Terry was articulated
by Justice Clark in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices
Reeds and Jackson. He reasoned that, although the Jaybird organization was
a voluntary association, it was operating as part and parcel of the Democratic
Party.92 The Court already had held in Smith that the Democratic Party was
bound by the strictures of the fifteenth amendment .93 Therefore, the action of
the Jaybirds was state action.9 4 He also used language indicating that state
action was present simply because the state had delegated a state function to
9 5
a political organization.
Justice Black, in a separate opinion, began with the premise that the Jaybird
primary produced a result that would have been unconstitutional had it been
obtained through a county operated primary.9 6 He then characterized the Democratic party primaries and the subsequent general, elections as "perfunctory
ratifiers" of the results of the Jaybird primaries from which blacks were excluded
from participation. 97 Justice Black's language indicated little concern for the
problem of federalism. Rather, his analysis was directed toward accommodating
the 'reasonable public expectation that elections of public officials should be
carried out in a constitutional manner.
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to
permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the

89.

It is not completely clear from the opinions whether or not the Jaybird Association was

a political party under Texas law. Justice Black stated that "[t]he district court found the Jaybird
association was a political organization or party." Id. at 482 (Clark, J., concurring). However,
Justice Frankfurter raised some question concerning this conclusion. Although "[t]he district court
found the Jaybird association is a political party within the meaning of the Texas legislation regulating primaries by political parties;" he noted that "[this] is a question of state law not to be
answered in the first instance by a federal Court. We do not know what the Texas Supreme Court
would say." Id. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Minton, dissenting, flatly rejected the
district court's conclusion and maintained instead that the Jaybird Association was not a political

party. Id. at 490 (Minton, J., dissenting).
90.
91.

Id. at 463 (Black, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 494 (Minton, J. dissenting).

92. Id. at 482.
93. Id. at 481.
94. [Wlhether viewed as a separate political organization or as an adjunct of the local Democratic Party, the Jaybird Democratic Association is the decisive power in the county's

recognized electoral process.... [Wjhen a state devolves upon a political organization the
uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes
on these attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into play.

Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 469.
97. Id.
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Fifteenth Amendment .... It violated the Fifteenth Amendment for a
state, by such circumvention, to permit, within its borders, the use of
any device that produced an equivalent of the prohibited election."'
The state's failure to prohibit the discrimination practiced by the Jaybirds sufficed for a finding of state action even though the state did not control, and
never had controlled, this aspect of the primary electoral process.""
Justice Frankfurter was more sensitive to federalism concerns than his colleagues, although he also found state action. "To say that Negroes should be
allowed to vote in the Jaybird primary would be to say that the State is under
a duty to see to it that Negroes may vote in that primary. We cannot tell the
State

that it must participate in and regulate this primary. .

. ."I"'

Justice

Frankfurter stated that for state action to be present, the court must find some
affirmative conduct by a state official under state power in a scheme to deprive
blacks of their right to vote."" However, for him, the participation of elected
officials and county election officials in the Jaybird primaries by voting was
sufficient to establish such state action. "'2 Thus, despite a different conclusion,
Justice Frankfurter advocated a position much like that taken by Justice Bradley
in the Civil Rights Cases.. Direct state action was still necessary for him, and he
remained sensitive to the limitations placed on the Court by the principle of
federalism.
Justice Frankfurter's position is not surprising in view of the Court's hesitancy to explicitly move away from the direct state action required in Smith
and in the cases the Court considered in the years between Smith and Terry.
In the first of these cases, Shelley v. Kraemer,"" the Court found state action but

98.

Id.

99. "It is immaterial that the state does not control that part of this elective process which
it leaves for the Jaybirds to manage. The Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed
the only effective part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and govern the
country." Id. Since the Civil Rights Cases required some direct action by a formal governmental
actor, legislative, judicial or executive, it never examined the flip side of the question, namely the
effect of the failure of the state to so act. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
100. 345 U.S. at 477.
101.
"The vital requirement is State responsibility that somewhere, somehow, to some
extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with state power, into any scheme
by which colored citizens are denied voting rights merely because they are colored." Id. at 473.
102. As the action of the entire white voting community, theJaybird primary is as a practical
matter the instrument of those few in this small county who are politically active - the
officials of the local Democratic Party and, we may assume, the elected officials of the
county. As a matter of practical politics, those charged by State law with the duty of
assuring all eligible voters an opportunity to participate in the selection of candidates at
the primary - the county election officials who are normally leaders in their communities
- participate by voting in the Jaybird primary. They join the white voting community
in proceeding with elaborate formality, in almost all respects parallel to the procedures
dictated by Texas law for the primary itself, to express their preferences in a wholly
successful effort to withdraw significance from the State - prescribed primary, to subvert
the operation of what is formally the law of the State for primaries in this county.
Id. at 473-74.

103.

334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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continued, as had Justice Frankfurter in Terry, to adhere to the Civil Rights
Cases' approach, requiring direct action by a governmental actor. Here, the
judiciary was acting through its power of equitable enforcement. The potential
ramifications of Shelley were far more extensive than any of the Court's prior
decisions. In Shelley, the Court held that the equitable enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants by state courts was state action in violation of the fourteenth
amendment."14 Because the covenants were agreements among private property
owners and adherence to them was wholly voluntary, standing alone they were
"
not violative of the fourteenth amendment.lr However, the state courts had
enforced the restrictive covenants contrary to the wishes of the buyers and
sellers. This judicial action resulted in putting two black families off of the
2 6
properties they had already purchased and occupied. ' The language used in
Shelley was reminiscent of Condon, where the Court had found state action because the power to discriminate was not present without the state. The Shelley
Court explained that "the purposes of the agreements were secured only by
judicial enforcement by state courts of the restrictive terms of the agree-

ments. 17
The scope of Shelley has troubled scholars. The opinion seems to reject the
contention that the mere potential backing of private conduct by the state would
8
be enough to invoke the state action doctrine.' To interpret Shelley otherwise
would take the decision to an extreme limit by rendering virtually all activities
state action. '9Judicial enforcement was apparently the key determining factor.I"
Yet, Shelley differed from the precedent upon which it purported to rely."' Unlike
104. Id. at 20.
105. Id. at 13.
106. Id. at 6-7.
107. Id. at 13-14; see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369; Friendly, supra note 17, at 1292,
1294. The Shelly Court recounted the language of numerous cases, including the Civil Rights Cases,
which demonstrated that the action of state courts and judicial officers was state action within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 334 U.S. at 14-16. Specifically, the Court found that state
court enforcement of common law rules was state action. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
actions of the state through its courts was the "but for" cause of the violation of the fourteenth
amendment rights of the black purchasers. Id. at 19-20. "It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have
been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint." Id. at 19. Thus, with little
deviation, the Court's analysis in Shelley still followed the formal mechanistic reasoning of the Civil
Rights Cases, despite its contrary conclusion regarding the existence of state action.
108. Id. at 19-21.
109. Cf. G. GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 1002. "Given the entanglement of private choices
with law, a broad application of Shelley would in effect have left no private choices immune from
constitutional restraints." See also H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE .CASE AND THE PUBLICPRIVATE PENUMBRA 16-17 (1969); Phillips, supra note 7, at 695.
110. It has also been suggested that the basis for Shelley was not the judicial enforcement of
the common law rules but the mere existence of that body of law. Friendly, supra note 17, at
1295; see also infra note 115.
111. Phillips, supra note 7, at 694 nn.51-52. The cases primarily relied upon to conclude that
state court enforcement of a common law principle is state action were Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941), AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940). None of these cases contained state action analysis. Apparently state action was assumed.
Phillips, supra note 7, at 694 nn.51-52. A similar dilemma existed when the Court in Lugar v.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVII

the prior decisions, the state court in Shelley was acting primarily as a ratifier
of private actions rather than as the initiating force behind the discrimination. '"
Thus, Professor Wechsler has criticized the Court's reasoning in Shelley, noting
that under it "the state may properly be charged with the discrimination when
it does no more than give effect to an agreement that the individual involved
is, by hypothesis, entirely free to make.""'
Subsequent decisions have shown that the Court has not given an expansive
reading to Shelley.' t 4 While the Court has continued to hold that judicial enforcement of common law rules is state action,"" it has not taken Shelley to its
theoretical limits. By the 1960's, the Court no longer cited Shelley in cases to
which it was relevant, at least with regard to its holding that judicial enforcement
of private action transformed the latter into state action." ' Other indicia of

Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934-35 (1982) relied on precedent that had merely presumed
state action, without discussing it.
112. Phillips, supra note 7, at 694.
113. Wechsler, Toward Neutral PAinciples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. R~v. 1, 29 (1959).
Five years after Shelley, and in the same year as the Court decided Terry, the Court was presented
with the issue of whether a state court's enforcement of a racially restrictive convenant in a suit
for damages against one of the co-covenantors was state action in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), the Court extended Shelley slightly by
holding that a state court's award of damages was state action under the fourteenth amendment
because it would sanction the covenant, effectively coercing the co-covenantor to continue to adhere
to the covenant and encouraging the use of restrictive covenants. Id. at 254. The end result of
allowing such damage awards would be additional discrimination against non-Caucasians. Id. The
Court reached this conclusion despite the absence of any non-Caucasian party to the suit. It relaxed
the rule that would have denied standing to raise the rights of others because there was a close
relationship between the covenant, its purpose, and the sanction of the state court, which would
punish the co-covenantor for obstructing the discrimination intended by the parties to the covenant.
Id. at 255-59. Justice Vinson, the author of Shelley, dissented in Barrows. 346 U.S. at 260. He
criticized the Court's approach to the standing issue. Id. at 264-65. However, his opinion sheds
light on the Court's reasoning in Shelley. According to Justice Vinson, Shelley had determined that
the restrictive covenants were valid between the parties and that opinion thus "dealt only with a
state court's attempt to enforce them directly against innocent third parties whose right to enjoy
their property would suffer immediate harm." Id. at 267. In addition, Justice Vinson made clear
that the terrible consequences of Shelley feared by commentators were not commanded by Shelley.
Shelley did not mean that every successful resort to a state court was a basis for finding state action.
Thus, in the Shelley case, it was not the covenants which were struck down but judicial
enforcement of them against Negro vendees. The question which we decided was simply
whether a state court could decree the ouster of Negroes from property which they had
purchased and were enjoying. We held that it could not. We held that such judicial action,
which operated directly against Negro petitioners and deprived them of their right to enjoy
their property solely because of their race, was state action and constituted a denial of
equal protection.
Id. at 261. Thus, Justice Vinson emphasized the direct nature of the state action and its consequences as the decisive factor in Shelley.
114. G. GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 1002-03; McCoy, supra note 15, at 792; Phillips, supra
note 7, at 695.
115. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (state tort law subject to first
amendment requirements); see supra note 110; cf. NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886
(1982) (state common law is state action).
116. Gunther, supra note 30, at 100-06; McCoy, supra note 15, at 793; Phillips, supra note 7,
at 696.
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state involvement would be necessary to justify a finding of state action.1" 7
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak"8 was also- decided in the years between
Smith and Terry. The Court in Pollak held that when the Commission permitted
a radio service to operate on a privately-owned transit system, state action was
present. This federal action invoked the first and fifth amendments because the
Commission was an agency authorized by Congress." 9 On the facts, since direct
governmental action was present, the Court was not yet forced to break com2
pletely out of the mold cast in the Civil Rights Cases.' "1
The only case in the years between Smith and Terry that totally broke away
from the Civil Rights Cases' requirement of formal direct action was Marsh v.
Alabama.' 2 ' In that case, the total absence of any state actors made resort to
any pretense of direct action by a formal governmental actor impossible. Yet
the Court was still willing to find state action, at least in part, because of the
importance that the Court attributed to public expectations.' 2 2 Additionally,
unlike the other decisions during this era, the state action question in Marsh
arose as a defense to a criminal prosecution. Arguably this made the Court
more amenable to a broader concept of state action. While the Court had begun
to develop a public function doctrine as a means for determining state action
as early as its decision in Condon,' 2 3 it was not until Marsh that the concept
blossomed. Under the public function doctrine, the actions of a private actor
that- are in the nature of a governmental function are viewed as state action
124
for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
In Marsh, the state action question was raised by a Jehovah's Witness who
had been convicted of criminal trespass. Her crime was distributing literature
on the sidewalks of the "business block" portion of Chickasaw, Alabama, a
company town owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. ' 5 She had been
arrested under Alabama's trespass statute by a deputy sheriff, who was paid
by the corporation to act as the town's policeman. The state court convicted
her, rejecting her claim that the statute, as applied to her, violated the first

117.

Phillips, supra note 7, at 696 n.63. See also Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City

Trusts, 353, U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (governmental action which was based on the state's role in

running an all-white private school rather than judicial enforcement of the discriminatory policies
required by the will establishing the school).
118.

343 U.S. 451 (1952).

119. Id. at 462-63. However, the Court found no violation of the first or fifth amendments.
Id. at 463-66. See also infra note 212.

120. Id. at 462.
121. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
122. The importance of the first amendment issue probably also made the Court more amenable
to expanding the state action definition. See infa text accompanying notes 134-35.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
124. See also J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 457 (2d ed. 1983).
Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976
Sup. CT. REv. 221, 223.
125. The corporation had posted notices prohibiting solicitation on its property. The only way
to circumvent the prohibition on solicitation was to apply for and receive a permit from the housing
manager of the town. The pamphleteer was told by the manager, a corporation official, that she
would not receive a permit, and thus never actually applied for one. 326 U.S. at 503.
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and fourteenth amendments. The state court of appeals affirmed on the ground
that the sidewalk was privately owned and had never been dedicated to the
public under Alabama law. The Supreme Court found state action and reversed.
The Court's analysis began by examining the state action question in the
context of the company town. It concluded that Chickasaw had taken on all
the characteristics of a municipality, including the provision of streets, a sewage
system and a business block. 2' The Court then phrased the issue in much the
same way as it would do later in Terry - whether Marsh's conviction would
have to be reversed had the title to Chickasaw belonged to a municipal corporation rather than to a private corporation. The Court answered in the affirmative,' 27 emphasizing that the public's expectation that first amendment rights
will be protected did not change because a private party had legal title to all
of the town.' 2" Echoing some of the reasoning of Justice Harlan's dissent in
the Civil Rights Cases, the Court stated that "whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical
interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels
of communication remain free.""' The Court was also clearly cognizant of the
magnitude of the public interest involved. Noting the prevalence of company
towns at the time,'"' the Court stressed that citizens of such towns, like all
other citizens, must be informed in order to make effective decisions which
affect the community's welfare. Being properly informed required uncensored
information.'" Use of the state trespass statute to prohibit the distribution of
views contrary to the wishes of the corporate owners of the town obviously
infringed upon the necessary free exchange of information. "There is no more
reason for depriving [citizens of company towns] of the liberties guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms

Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 505.
Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but to a municipal corporation
and had appellant been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance rather than a ruling
by those appointed by the corporation to manage a company town it would have been
clear that appellant's conviction must be reversed.
Id. at 504.
128. Id. at 507. In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter expressed similar views regarding
public expectations and state-defined property rights.
A company-owned town gives rise to a net-work of property relations. As to these, the
judicial organ of a State has the final say. But a company-owned town is a town. In its
community aspects it does not differ from other towns. These community aspects are
decisive in adjusting the relations now before us, and more particularly in adjudicating
the clash of freedoms which the Bill of Rights was designed to resolve - the freedom of
the community to regulate its life and the freedom of the individual to exercise his religion
and to disseminate his ideas. Title to property as defined by State law controls property
relations; it cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a company
town is a town as well as a congeries of property relations.
Id. at 510-11.
129. Id. at 507.
130. Id. at 508, 508 n.5.
131.
Id. at 508.
126.
127.
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2
with respect to any other citizen."'1 Accordingly, private corporations which
have established company towns must also expect that their conduct will be
subject to constitutional limitations. The more the actions of private corporations
approximate those of a municipality, the greater will be the public expectation
that such conduct will be subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amend-

ment.'

33

The Court concluded that the state-defined property rights of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation did not allow the corporation to restrict Chickasaw citizens'
34
In reachfirst amendment rights by application of the state's trespass statute.
ing this conclusion, the Court, characterizing first amendment rights as occupying a "preferred position," suggested that, in first amendment cases, the

competing fundamental liberty and property rights should be subjected to a
balancing approach. 35 The relative constitutional "weight" of certain rights
should not be the only factor considered in any balancing approach. The language in Marsh and its progeny suggest that the court must evaluate the relative
extent and reasonableness of the public expectations with regard to first amendment rights. These must be balanced against the state's power to determine
and enforce property rights by use of its trespass laws. Thus, Marsh was a
watershed in state action case law for two reasons. First, the necessity of showing
a direct causal relationship between the challenged action and a governmental
actor had been eliminated. Second, public expectations had achieved hegemony
over federalism as a doctrinal objective.

132. Id. at 508-09. In Marsh, the Court took note of the absence of an alternative forum in
Chickasaw in its determination of state action. Subsequently, this observation was at least partially
used in reverse in Flagg Bros., where the Court referred to the availability of remedial alternatives
for the plaintiff as a basis for not finding state action. See infra text accompanying notes 258-68.
133. 326 U.S. at 506. The Court thus equated the privately-owned company town with, a
municipal corporation. The Court seemed to indicate that its public function concept, however,
was not limited to the municipality equation. Rather, the Court looked to various "facilities [that]
are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a
public function, it is subject to state regulation.... [S]uch regulation may not result in an operation
of these facilities, even by privately owned companies, which unconstitutionally interferes with and
discriminates against interstate commerce." 326 U.S. at 506 (footnote omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 452 N.E.2d 188 (1983) (court upheld trespass convictions of
defendants who had attempted to distribute leaflets concerning the nuclear arms race at a technological laboratory). The court in Hood held that the laboratory was a private entity operating a
business and not performing a public function. Id. at 192. The fact that the laboratory allowed
pedestrians and cars to pass through the property of the private business did not change the private
nature of that entity for purposes of the first amendment. Id.
134. In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the
deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is
not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint
by the application of a state statute.
Id.
135. "When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the
people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact
that the latter occupy a preferred position." 326 U.S. at 509 (footnote omitted).
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In Amalgamated Food Employees' Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,"'
the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Marshall, held that a shopping
center where union employees were picketing was the functional equivalent of
the business block in Marsh."" Therefore, the state could not "delegate the
power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members
of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights .
1.8.""'However, Justice Black, the author of the Marsh opinion, dissented in Logan Valley.
His dissent in Logan Valley provides some insight into his intentions in writing
the Marsh opinion. Justice Black disagreed with the Court's characterization of
the shopping center as the functional equivalent of a community business block.
He maintained that the decisive factor in Marsh was that the private property
had taken on "all the attributes of a town.""13 Despite their opposite results,
however, the positions taken by both the majority and Justice Black reflected
the importance of determining the circumstances that could raise a reasonable
public expectation of first amendment protection. Even though Justice Black
did not find state action in Logan Valley, he implicitly approved of the majority's
analysis where it examined the totality of the situation. The majority had used
this analysis to determine whether reasonable public expectations of constitu1 41 1
tional protection existed.

136.

391 U.S. 308 (1968).

137. Id. at 318. Again the Court's analytical approach was similar to that of Terry and
Marsh. "[I]f the shopping center premises were not privately owned but instead constituted the
business area of a municipality, which they to a large extent resemble, petitioners could not be
barred from exercising their First Amendment rights ..
" 391 U.S. at 315. See also Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. at 96 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 147 (1939); Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. at 413 (1943). "The essence of those opinions is that streets, sidewalks, parks and other
similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that
access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly
and absolutely." 391 U.S. at 315.
138. 391 U.S. at 319.
139. Id. at 332.
140. Id. Two later decisions, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), severely restricted the applicability of the public forum concept to
private shopping centers. But see Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Both
Lloyds and Hudgens involved the scope of the rights of pamphleteers or picketeers on the property
of privately owned shopping centers. Neither decision found state action. Both reflected a significant
dimunition in what the Court perceived as reasonableness concerning any public expectations that
the private property was being held out to the public for a particular purpose that would render
it subject to constitutional limitations. In Lloyd, the Court considered the question it had expressly
reserved in Logan Valley, specifically whether the privately owned shopping center had the right to
prohibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the handbilling was unrelated to the
operations of the shopping center. 407 U.S. at 552. Lloyd answered in the affirmative. Id. at 55556. Marsh's finding of state action in prohibiting the distribution of religious literature was limited
to the economic anamoly of the company town, which took on all the characteristics of other
American towns. The Court also distinguished Logan Valley, holding that in the case then before
the Court there was no relationship, direct or indirect, between the purpose of the expressive
activity - distribution of anti-Vietnam war literature - and the business of the shopping center.
Id. at 564. Moreover, unlike the leafleteers in either Marsh or Logan Valley, those involved in Lloyd,
anti-Vietnam war protestors, could just as effectively have used alternative public forums, such as
public streets or sidewalks. Id. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart,
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The totality approach used in Marsh was employed in a similar manner in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.' 4 In Burton, the Court analyzed the state

action question by examining the totality of the relationship between a state
agency and a private actor. The Wilmington Parking Authority, the state agency,
had leased space to the Eagle Coffee Shop, a restaurant. Eagle had refused to
serve the black plaintiff, relying on a Delaware statute that allowed places of
public accommodation to refuse service to "persons whose reception . . . would
be offensive to the major part of [the establishment's] customers. . .. ,'14 The

plaintiff sued the Parking Authority seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on
the basis that Eagle's refusal to serve him violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court examined the totality of connections
between the Parking Authority and the restaurant, without indicating whether
all of them, or any of them individually or in various combinations, sufficed
to support its finding of state action. However, contrary to the approach later
taken by the Burger Court, the Court in Burton made no attempt to limit its
focus to those contacts between the state and the private entity which bore
directly upon the challenged action. Rather, the Court made a detailed factual

dissented. Marshall noted two factors that made the Lloyd Center shopping center more like a
public forum than the shopping center in Logan Valley. First, Lloyd Center was more intertwined
with public streets than was Logan Valley, and second, Lloyd's private police, although hired, ,
fired, controlled and paid for by the private owners of the shopping center, were given full police
power by the city. The dissenters asserted that since the Lloyd Center opened itself up to a range
of speakers and activities unrelated to its business tenants, the activities of the anti-Vietnam handbillers "were directly related in purpose to the use to which the shopping center was being put
...[and] therefore, this case presents no occasion to consider whether or not Logan Valley should
be extended." Id. at 579 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, even if the handbills were not related
to the purpose of the shopping center, the dissenters would still conclude that such unrelated speech
could not be proscribed because when balancing the freedom to speak with the freedom of a private
property owner to control his property, the freedom of speech, in view of its preferred status, must
prevail. Id. at 580 (Marshall, J. dissenting). Finally, in a discussion reminiscent of that in Marsh
regarding the function of and prevalence of company towns, the dissent noted that shopping centers,
with their increasing growth, had become, as in this case, "truly ... the functional equivalent of
a public business area .... Id. at 585 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Four years later in Hudgens, the Court held that the "rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the
Court's opinion in the Lloyd case." 424 U.S. at 518 (footnote omitted). The Court held that a
large, self-contained shopping center is not the functional equivalent of a municipality, as Logan
Valley had held, and therefore the first and fourteenth amendments are not applicable. Id. at 52021. At issue in Hudgens was whether a threat by the agent of the owner of private property on
which union members were picketing that they would be arrested for criminal trespass if they did
not depart was a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 508. The picketers were
protesting a company's failure to agree to union demands in negotiating their contracts for employment in the company's warehouse. However, the picketers were also at the retail outlets of
the company. Id. at 509. Relying on Lloyd, the Court concluded that the picketer had no first
amendment rights with regard to their speech at this location. Id. at 521. Justice Marshall, joined
by Justice Brennan, dissented, arguing that Logan Valley was not dead because Lloyd had only dealt
with the question left unanswered in Logan Valley. Id. at 535-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Professor Tribe has referred to Burton as "a major spider on the
seamless web of state action law." J. CHOOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

142.

187 (1981-82).

24 Del. Code Ann. tit 24, § 1501 (1981); see also 365 U.S. at 717 n.l.
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examination of all mutually beneficial contacts between the state and the private
restaurant. The Court found the actions of the Parking Authority and the
restaurant were so intertwined as to establish a symbiotic relationship. 4 '
The facts of the case evidenced significant state involvement with the restaurant. The property was publicly owned and dedicated to public uses under
Delaware law.' 44 The area leased by the restaurant was integrated physically
and financially, as part of the state's plan to operate the garage as a selfsupporting project.' 4 ' The Authority was responsible for maintaining and repairing the property with public funds. 46 The restaurant enjoyed tax exemptions
to the extent it made improvements to the realty.' 47 Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, "the peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the parking facility
in which it is located conferred on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits.' ' 48 Restaurant guests were provided a convenient place to park their
automobiles.' 49 Similarly, the state benefited by the receipt of rental monies,
the additional parking demand from restaurant patrons, and convenience for
its own employees.'" The Court concluded that "[i]n view of Eagle's affirmative
allegation that for it to serve Negroes would injure its business. . .profits earned
by discrimination not only contribute to, but also are indispensable elements
in, the financial success of a governmental agency.'''
The Court was perhaps
most troubled by this last connection between the state and the restaurant and
thus emphasized its importance. In so doing, the Court arguably set the stage
for the creation of a nascent nexus test for determining state action. This test
would emerge as the dominant one used by the Burger Court.'
Because of the facts involved, the Marsh plaintiff had not asserted an interdependence between the state and the Gulf Shipbuilding Company, as existed

143. The relationship was so characterized for the time in the Court's subsequent opinion in
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
[This symbiotic relationship] category is, in reality, a 'catch all' which may have little, if
any substantive meaning. All that can be said with certainty is that some otherwise private
actors have been found to have sufficient state action to subject them to constitutional
restraints even though no single factor indicated that the government was responsible for
their activities.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 124, at 516. In any case, the Burton Court, noting
that "[d]ifferences in circumstances beget appropriate differences in law," limited its holding to
the lease situation then before the Court. 365 U.S. at 726.
144. 365 U.S. at 723.
145. Id. at 723-24.
146. Id. at 724.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Under the nexus test, state action exists only when there is a sufficiently close connection
between the state activity and the specially challenged action of the private party. All other connections between the state and the private party are essentially irrelevant. Thus, the Burger Court
would subsequently use the nexus test to replace the cumulative, totality approach of Burton and
would instead examine seriatim individual indicia of state action to determine the application of
constitutional limits.
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in Burton between the restaurant and the Parking Authority. Nevertheless, the
Marsh decision also examined the totality of the functions performed by the
privately owned town in concluding that the company town functioned like any
other municipality. Thus, both Marsh and Burton used a cumulative 53rather than
a seriatim approach to analyze the various indicia of state action.
The Court in Burton concededly did not advance any precise formula for
recognizing state responsibility. 54 Instead, in an oft-quoted phrase, it reasoned
that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
55
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.")
Although the Court acknowledged several different bases for finding state action,

it did not indicate which of these, if any, was actually decisive. 's This theoretical
153. 365 U.S. at 724. This changed dramatically in the Burger Court decisions. See infra text
accompanying notes 231-38; 289; 291-94.
154. 365 U.S. at 725.
155. Id. at 722. The Burton Court quoted Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which held
that "[s]tate participation through any arrangement, management, funds, or property results in
state responsibility for actions that deny the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 4. In its effort
to find any "nonobvious" state involvement, the Burton Court reasoned that the constitutional
protection of equal protection was violated only when, "to some significant extent the State in any
of its manifestations[,] has been found to have become involved in," 365 U.S. at 722, the "private
conduct abridging individual rights." Id.
156. The Burton Court stressed that "no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by
either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be." 365
U.S. at 725. The Authority had failed to exercise the power it had under Delaware law to require
in the lease that the restaurant's service be available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Id. The decision is thus often cited for supporting the idea that a state's inaction can be the basis
for a finding of state action. "By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not
only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and
prestige behind the admitted discrimination." Id. See Yaeclde, The Burger Court, "State Action, " and
CongressionalEnforcement of the Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. REv. 479 483-84 (1975); Note, State
Action AfterJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.: Analytics/Frameworkfor a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DicK.
L. REv. 315, 316 (1977). Cf., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 501, 509 ("In our view the
circumstance that the property rights to the premises .. .were held by others than the public, is
not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to . . . restrict [citizen's] fundamental
liberties .... ); see also Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830, 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (maintaining
that a state may not avoid its constitutional responsibilities by delegating the performance of its
obligations to a private entity). But see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("a [s]tate
normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power
or has provided . . . significant encouragement"). However, "[mlere approval of or acquiescence
in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible." Id.;
see also Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. 149; infra text accompanying notes 274-75; see also Buchanan, State
Authorization, Class Discrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1984). Thus,
three major aspects of state action analysis emerged from Burton. First is the concept of an interdependent relationship between the state and the private entity, which, later came to be referred
to as a symbiotic relationship. The state was thus viewed as a joint participant in the private
conduct. Second, in order to evaluate this interdependency, the Court used a cumulative rather
than seriatim approach to examine the totality of connections between the private entity and the
state. This analytical approach eventually was rejected by the Burger Court. Third, failure of the
state to act might itself constitute state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Again,
this rationale was eventually rejected by the Burger Court. Curiously, the Burton opinion did not
always cite relevant Supreme Court precedent that would have supported some of its reasoning.
The language used in Marsh, Smith, and Teny could have lent some support to the establishment
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eclecticism may have demonstrated the Court's effort to overcome any lingering
judicial hesitancy to hold the state responsible for the discriminatory actions of
a private party in the absence of direct official involvement in the discrimination
itself. This may be so, at least to the extent that such private actions were not
in the nature of a public function." 7
Although public expectations were not independently determinative of the
state action issue in Burton, the Court did implicitly acknowledge their importance. In fact, Burton and .Marsh probably represent the high water mark for
considering the importance of public expectations in determining whether state
action exists. In its recitation of the facts, the Burton Court noted that the
Parking Authority placed "official signs indicating the public character of the
building" and that it flew the state and national flags from the mastheads on
the roof. These observations are only relevant because such actions affect the
public's perception of the building's occupant. The perception that the restaurant was open to the public would give rise to the expectation that its actions
would be subject to constitutional limitations. Moreover, the Court's cumulative
approach made it possible, even preferable, to consider public expectations in
resolving the state action question. The Burger Court's subsequent rejection of
this totality approach occurred simultaneously with its dimunition of any consideration of public expectations in determining the proper scope of state action.
The Burton majority was seemingly oblivious to any question of federalism.
Only Justice Harlan, in his dissent, exhibited any concern for principles of
federalism. Even that concern dealt primarily with a question of timing, namely,
whether the federal judiciary had prematurely determined the state action question before the state court had given a definitive interpretation of the state
public accommodations law. This law purportedly gave the private restaurant
the right to discriminate.""
In its next major state action case, Evans v. Newton," ' the Court returned
to the governmental function analysis articulated some twenty years earlier in
of state action on the basis that the state's failure to prohibit the restaurant's discrimination was
the equivalent of permitting such discrimination. The public nature of the building and the use
of signs indicating such could have enabled the Court to analogize the restaurant in Burton to the
company town in Marsh on the basis that the more private premises are opened up to the public
for general purposes, the more reasonable are the public's expectations that the private owner would
be subject to the limitations of the Constitution. None of these cases were, however, cited for any
of these propositions.
157. Justice Stewart would have avoided any question of such hesitancy by finding state action
directly on the basis of the Delaware Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute under which
the restaurant claimed the right to discriminate in its services. Justice Stewart believed the statute
so interpreted "authoriz[ed] discriminatory classification based exclusively on color." 365 U.S. at
727 (Stewart, J., concurring). If the statute had been so interpreted, Justice Harlan would have
struck down the statute and enjoined the Eagle Restaurant from discriminating if its policy of racial
discrimination were not solely the result of the owners' choice. Justice Harlan thought that the
majority's decision on the constitutional issue was premature and would have preferred to refrain
from resolving the problems in state - federal relations with which the Court's opinion deals by
first obtaining a definitive interpretation of the Delaware statute from the Delaware Supreme Court.
Id. at 729-30 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 729 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see supra note 157.
159. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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Marsh. This time, however, the Court employed the analysis outside the context
of the company town. In Evans, the Court held that a city, in order to continue
segregation practices, could not circumvent the equal protection clause by transferring the operation of a municipal park to a private person."i"
At the outset, the Court noted the need to reconcile the individual's right
to pick his own associates with the constitution's ban against "state-sponsored
racial inequality".' 6 ' The conflict between these two principles was becoming
more pronounced as the court moved away from the formal view of state action,
which required direct state participation, to one that would find state action
when private persons performed governmental functions. Thus, the Court concluded that "when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.' 6 2" biting
Marsh, the Court reiterated that private ownership and management of a town
did not allow the private owners to treat the town "as if it were wholly in the
private sector."' ' 63 Private persons to whom the state delegated a public function,
such as the administration of the elective process, would similarly be subject
to constitutional restraints under the Court's prior holding in Terry.' 6 Thus,
the governmental function analysis would be used either when the state allowed
a private party to assume the performance, as in Marsh, or when the state
65
actually delegated the performance to the private actor, as in Terry.

160. The case involved land that had been devised to the City of Macon, Georgia, by the
will of U.S. Senator Augustus 0. Bacon, for use as a park by white people only. The Bacon will
further provided that the park's Board of Managers be made up of seven white persons. The city
acted as trustee. After years of keeping the park segregated, the city eventually allowed blacks to
use it in the belief that the park was a public facility which could not be constitutionally maintained
on a segregated basis. The members of the Board of Managers brought suit in state court to have
the city removed as trustee and to have the court appoint new trustees, to whom the title to the
park would then be transferred. Id. at 296-98. In addition to the City of Macon, the suit also
named the trustees of certain residuary beneficiaries of the Senator's estate. Id. at 297-98. In its
answer, the city asserted that it could not legally enforce racial discrimination in the park. Several
black Macon citizens intervened in the suit alleging that the racial discrimination was unlawful
and asked the court to refuse to appoint private trustees. The city then resigned as trustee. Upon
its resignation as trustee, the city amended its answer accordingly. Other heirs of Senator Bacon
then intervened and, along with the defendants other than the city, asked for reversion of the trust
property to the Bacon estate in the event that the prayer of the petition was denied. Id. at 298.
The Georgia trial court accepted the city's resignation as trustee, and appointed three individuals
as trustees. The black intervenors appealed, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed on the
ground that Senator Bacon had the right to give his property to a limited class of people. The
Georgia court concluded that appointing new trustees in order to further the purpose of the trust
was within the power of the court supervising the charitable trust. Id. The United States Supreme
Court reversed, finding state action violative of the Constitution. Id. at 302.
161. Id. at 298.
162. Id. at 299.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 87-99.
165. Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies
or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
limitations placed upon state action. The action of a city in serving as trustee of property

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVII

The Evans Court's public function analysis rested on two grounds: first, the
tradition of municipal control of the park, and second, the municipal nature
of the service rendered to the community by the park."" With regard to the
traditional municipal control of the park, the Court noted that "for years, it
was an integral part of the City of Macon's activities . . . . [Ilt was swept,
manicured, watered, patrolled, and maintained by the city as a public facility
for whites only, as well as granted tax exemption under""" the Georgia statute.",s The Court contrasted this situation with those in which segregation occurred, but in which the private conduct did not implicate the state in the
supervision, control, or management functions.""b Implicitly, the importance of
public expectations in determining the state action question was recognized in
this traditionality test. Tradition can create public expectations of constitutional
protections. The Court thus held that "where the tradition of municipal control
had become firmly established . . . the mere substitution of trustees" did not
"instantly [transfer] this park from the public to the private sector.""' "
That the park's segregation was still attributable to the city was evidenced
by the Court's conclusion that "[t]he service rendered even by a private park
of this character is municipal in nature.""' The Court observed that a park

under a private will serving the segregated cause is an obvious example. See Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230.
382 U.S. at 299. Nevertheless, the Court was already concerned with placing some proper limits
on the public function analysis. As in Marsh and Burton, the Court recognized the need to look at
the totality of facts and circumstances to determine whether the fourteenth amendment is applicable
in a particular case.
[However, the Court cautioned that] [tihe range of governmental activities is broad
and varied, and the fact that government has engaged in a particular activity does not
necessarily mean that an individual entrepreneur or manager of the same kind of undertaking suffers the same constitutional inhibitions. While a State may not segregate public
schools so as to exclude one or more religious groups, those sects may maintain their own
parochial educational systems. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 510.
382 U.S. at 300.
166. Id. at 301. Because of the existence of the governmental function, there was, however,
no reason, as there had been in Burton, for eclectic theorizing. The Court in Burton had not, of
course, utilized the governmental function formulation since operating a restaurant is, by itself,
simply a private commercial function. In the White Primary Cases, the Court had also engaged in
some eclectic theorizing despite the arguable performance of a public function. However. as I have
already noted, this theoretical eclecticism is attributable to the Court's earlier hesitancy to move
away from the rigid requirement of direct action by a formal state actor.
167. 382 U.S. at 301.
168. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (1973).
169. 382 U.S. at 300.
170. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
Whether these public characteristics will in time be dissipated is wholly conjectural. If
the municipality remains entwined in the management or control of the park, it remains
subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment just as the private utility in Public
Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462, remained
subject to the Fifth Amendment because of the surveillance which federal agencies had
over its affairs.
Id.
171.
Id.
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is similar to a fire department, which traditionally serves the community. 72
Thus, since Macon had traditionally operated the park as a public facility and
since the park was by nature municipal, the park should be treated as a public
institution for purposes of the fourteenth amendment even though the title was
held privately.

73

Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. 74 He was most concerned about what he perceived to be the absence of logical pragmatic limitations
to the applicability of the public function analysis.' 75 The indeterminate nature

172. Id. at 302. "Mass recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public domain,
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526." Id.
173. Id. The Court added that "state courts that aid private parties to perform [a] public
function on a segregated basis implicate the State in conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Curiously, Shelley was not cited to support this statement.
Justice White, in a concurring opinion, would have found state action on the basis of the
Georgia statutes governing charitable trusts, which he maintained prohibited all private discrimination except racial discrimination in the creation of a charitable trust. Id. at 305 (White, J.,
concurring). The statutes themselves, according to Justice White, thus validated the discriminatory
condition in Senator Bacon's will. Other than these specific statutes, Georgia statutory law, which
adopted the common law of charities, precluded the creation of a charitable trust that is beneficial
only to some limited classification of inhabitants of a community rather than beneficial to all
members of that community generally. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). While Georgia statutory
law could not be said to "have directly coerced private discrimination," Justice White concluded
that "such a statute . . . depart[ed] from a policy of strict neutrality in matters of private discrimination by enlisting the State's assistance only in aid of racial discrimination." Id. at 306
(White, J., concurring). Thus, the racial discrimination in Senator Bacon's trust "reflectfed] ...
state policy" and, therefore, violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring) (citing Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156-57, (1964)). Much of this reasoning was
reflected in Justice White's subsequent plurality decision in Rdtman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
See infra text accompanying notes 178-85; see also Burton, 365 U.S. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 728 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the state action implications of statutory construction);
J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra note 141, at 184 (maintaining that the state "is not
responsible for all acts that are contained in some causal chain between an initial state rule of law
and an ultimate injury, but if the rule of law itself is properly brought in question in a case that
reaches the Supreme Court, its validity must be ruled upon").
174. 382 U.S. at 315. While believing that the writ of certiorari should have been dismissed
as "improvidently granted," Justice Harlan, nevertheless, felt compelled to examine the merits,
since the Court had done so. Id. at 315-16 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices believed
the writ should have been dismissed "because the far-reaching constitutional question [was not]
tendered ... by [the] record with sufficient clarity ... to justify its adjudication." Id. at 315
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
175. Justice Harlan characterized the majority's conclusion, that the operation of the park was
state actionlindependent of such factors as use of public property or funds, management by the
city, or lack of continuing supervision by a public regulatory agency, as a "novel" theory. 382
U.S. at 319 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan maintained that the only decision supporting
the majority's holding, Marsh v.Alabama, was itself "shaky precedent" since "[w]hile no stronger
case for the 'public function' theory can be imagined," only five Justices joined the majority opinion,
one of whom concurred separately, and three justices dissented. Id. at 321 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan commented that the reasoning of Marsh had not since been used as the basis of
other decisions nor had it been extended. Id. Note that Justice Harlan also criticized that aspect
of the majority opinion that found state action on "the assumption ... that the city itself maintained
[the park] in the past," and "[t]he conjecture .. . that it will continue to be connected with the
administration of the park in the future." Id. at 318 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of the majority's public function test was ultimately a primary basis for its
demise under the Burger Court.' 76 Thus, Justice Harlan feared an all-pervasive
public function theory of state action would impair, if not obliterate, the public/
private distinction, "transferring to federal authority vast areas of concern whose
regulation has wisely been left by the Constitution to the States."' 77 Federalism
was again rearing its head, but, as of yet, only the dissenters saw it and reacted.
As the majority opinion and Justice Harlan's dissent indicate, the two objectives of state action underwent a reversal in relative importance in the time
between the Civil Rights Cases and the mid-1960's. Federalism had clearly taken
a back seat to an activist federal judiciary concerned with protecting the civil
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Nowhere is this turn-around
more obvious than in the next major state action decision of the Warren Court,
Reitman v. Mulkey.' 7"
Reitman concerned the validity of a California constitutional amendment that
prohibited the state from limiting a person's freedom of choice in the sale,
lease, or rental of real property. Justice White, writing for the Court, 7" held
that the amendment was unconstitutional because it involved the state in impermissible racial discrimination in the housing market. The amendment overturned pre-existing state laws proscribing discrimination in real estate
transactions. "' The Court affirmed the California Supreme Court which had

176. See 382 U.S. at 321-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting). A shared concern for this problem subsequently led Justice Rehnquist to redesign the public function test by imposing a new exclusivity
requirement. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Ironically, in so doing,
Justice Rehnquist cited to the majority opinion in Newton for support of this requirement. Id. at
352 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)).
177. 382 U.S. at 322.
178. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
179. Compare Justice White's concurring opinion in Evans and his reliance on state statutes
as a basis for finding state action with his opinion for the Court in Reitian. Both of White's
opinions rely heavily on a precise analysis of state statutes. But cf. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991; infra text accompanying notes 291-95.
180. The Court considered whether article I, section 26, of the California Constitution, which
had been adopted pursuant to an initiative and referendum known as Proposition 14, denied equal
protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 387 U.S. at 370. The amendment to the state
constitution, embodied in section 26, provided in part as follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly
or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any
part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such
person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Id. at 371 n.2. Two cases were discussed in this opinion, Mulke and Prendergast. Id. at 372. Both
cases involved black couples suing under the Unruh Act, California Civil Code sections 51 and
52, which provided in part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what
their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever ....
Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or
whoever makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of color, race,
religion, ancestry, or national origin, contrary to the provisions of Section 51 of this code,
is liable for each and every such offense for the actual damages, and two hundred fifty
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invalidated the state constitutional provision, but stressed that the state court
"did not posit a constitutional violation on the mere repeal" of the previous
anti-discrimination statutes. 8" Likewise, it did not establish "an automatic constitutional barrier to the repeal of an existing law prohibiting racial discriminations in housing," or "rule that a State may never put in statutory form
an existing policy of neutrality with respect to private discriminations."' 82 Instead, the California court had based its decision on an assessment of the intent
and impact of the statute.' 3 The constitutional provision not only repealed the
dollars ($250) in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in
Section 51 of this code.
Id. at 372 n.3. The Mulkeys alleged that Reitman had refused to rent an apartment to them solely
because of their race and sought damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 372. The California trial
court granted Reitman summary judgment on the ground that section 26 of the state constitution
nullified the Unruh Act. Id. The Mulkeys appealed to the California Supreme Court, which held
section 26 invalid as violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 372-73.
The Prendergasts sought to enjoin their eviction, which allegedly was motivated by racial prejudice. Id. at 372. The trial court in that case did not reach the issue of the California Constitution
because it concluded that judicial enforcement of such an eviction would violate the fourteenth
amendment. Snyder appealed, but the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Id. at 373.
181. Id. at 376.
182. Id.
183. What the court below did was first to reject the notion that the State was required
to have a statute prohibiting racial discriminations in housing. Second, it held the intent
of S 26 was to authorize private racial discriminations in the housing market, to repeal
the Unruh and Rumford Acts and to create a constitutional right to discriminate on racial
grounds in the sale and leasing of real property. Hence, the court dealt with § 26 as
though it expressly'authorized and constitutionalized the private right to discriminate. Third,
the court assessed the ultimate impact of 5 26 in the California environment and concluded
that the section would encourage and significantly involve the State in private racial discrimination contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
In approving the California court's state action analysis, the Supreme Court noted that it was
"similar to what this Court has done in appraising state statutes or other official actions in other
contexts." Id. at 379. The Court then briefly reviewed the facts and holdings in McCabe v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), Nixon, Burton, Peterson, Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963), and Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964), and concluded:
None of these cases squarely controls the case we now have before us. But they do illustrate
the range of situations in which discriminatory state action has been identified. They do
exemplify the necessity for a court to assess the potential impact of official action in
determining whether the State has. significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations.
387 U.S. at 380. Peterson, Robinson, and Lombard were part of a series of cases decided by the court
in the early 1960's known as the Sit-In Cases. In Peterson, ten blacks were convicted in a South
Carolina state court of criminal trespass arising out of an incident in which they had remained
seated at a lunch counter after the restaurant's manager had announced that the counter was closed.
Peterson, 373 U.S. at 245. There was evidence indicating that the manager of the defendant store
refused service to black youths in order to comply with a city ordinance that prohibited serving
white and black people in the same room. Chief Justice Warren's opinion held that the fourteenth
amendment was applicable since the state had involved itself in the resulting discrimination. Id.
at 247.
When a state agency passes a law compelling persons to discriminate against other persons
because of race, and the State's criminal processes are employed in a way which enforces
the discrimination mandated by that law, such a palpable violation of the Fourteenth
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prior anti-discrimination statutes, but now ensured that discrimination was
"embodied in the State's basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or
Amendment cannot be saved by attempting to separate the mental urges of discriminators.

Id. at 248. Justice Harlan concurred in the result, but disagreed with the conclusion of the majority
that "the mere existence of the ordinance rendered the State's enforcement of its trespass laws unconstitutional, quite irrespective of whether the Kress decision to exclude these petitioners from the
white lunch counter was actually influenced by the ordinance." Id. at 250-51 (Harlan, J., concurring). He contended that the latter issue was a question of fact. According to Justice Harlan
the Court's analysis deprived private restauranteurs in states where there were ordinances such as
Greenville's of the right to choose to operate on a segregated basis. In Lombard v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 267 (1963), four college students, three black and one white, were convicted under a
criminal mischief statute for remaining seated at a lunch counter after the manager of the establishment ordered them to leave. Id. at 268. There was no state statute or city ordinance mandating
segregated eating facilities. However, the Mayor and Superintendent of Police of New Orleans had
both issued statements indicating that such "sit-ins" would not be permitted. The statements were
published in the newspaper. The store manager testified that his decision to operate a segregated
eating facility conformed to state and local policy, practice, and custom. The Court, again in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Warren, found state action because "[a) State, or a city, may
act authoritatively through its executive as through its legislative body. . . . Equally the State cannot
achieve the same result by an official command which has at least as much coercive effect as an
ordinance." Id. at 273. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion in which he emphasized
the public nature of the restaurant. Id. at 278 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas also
asserted that state action could be found, "wholly apart from the activity of the Mayor and police,
for Louisiana has interceded with its judiciary to put criminal sanctions behind racial discrimination
in public places." Id. Justice Douglas also found state involvement because the restaurant was
licensed. Id. at 281 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Harlan dissented. Id. at 248 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). He argued that the statements of the officials were directed at the general public, not
just private restauranteurs and that the statements were made not for the purpose of perpetuating
segregation, but to maintain public order. Two per curiam Sit-In opinions were also handed down
by the Court during this same term. See Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober
v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963).
A second round of Sit-In Cases was handed down in the Court's next Term, including Robinson
v. Florida, cited by Justice White in Reitman. Robinson reversed the trespass convictions of demonstrators in a department store lunch counter because two state agencies had issued regulations
requiring segregated toilet facilities, thus placing an impermissible burden on restaurants that served
both white and black patrons. Justice Black, writing for the Court, acknowledged that the regulations
did not forbid restaurants from serving both races together. He asserted that "in this case we do
not reach the broad question whether the Fourteenth Amendment of its own force forbids a State
to arrest and prosecute those who, having been asked to leave a restaurant because of their color,
refuse to do so." 378 U.S. at 155. Because there was a "state policy putting burdens upon any
restaurant which serves both races, burdens bound to discourage the serving of the two races
together," this case fell within the ambit of Peterson. Id. at 156. In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
130 (1964), five blacks were convicted of criminal trespass for refusing to leave a privately-owned
amusement park. They were arrested pursuant to the order of the park manager by a private
security officer who was also a deputy sheriff of the county. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
Court, held that the officer had purported to exercise the authority of a deputy sheriff. 378 U.S.
at 135. "If an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority,
his action is state action." Id. In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Brennan, did not resolve the state action question, and remanded the trespass convictions
involved in the case to the state courts to consider in light of an interim change in state law. 378
U.S. at 228. However, three other Justices wrote opinions that specifically addressed the question
of whether state enforcement of racial discrimination in public accommodations is unconstitutional.
Justice Goldberg argued that "the State by statute or by 'the good old common law' is obligated
to guarantee all citizens access to places of public accomodation." Id. at 296 (Goldberg. J., concurring). A state's failure to enforce this guarantee is a denial of equal protection. Justice Douglas,
in a separate opinion, stated that Maryland's protection of a policy of racial exclusion through
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judicial regulation at any level of the state government."'' ls The precise rationale
of the decision is far from clear, although probably it is explained best as holding
that governmental authorization or encouragement of private activity could justify a finding of state action.' 85
Concurring, Justice Douglas characterized the issue as "a problem in the
realm of zoning," similar to the one in Shelley.'8 6 In his view "[z]oning is a
state and municipal function,"'" 7 which could not be performed in a racially
discriminatory manner by private institutions licensed by the state. Justice Douglas reasoned that since real estate brokers were licensed by the state, the racial
discrimination practiced by the brokers was tantamount to the state practicing
discrimination itself.1as Furthermore, he characterized the urban housing market
as the "public domain"' 8 9 and the service provided by real estate brokers as
"affected with a public interest in the historic and classical sense."' 9 Thus,
brokers were to be held to the same duty as that of "restaurants, inns and
192
as well as "telephone companies, drugstores [and] hospitals."'
carriers,"''
state executive and judicial machinery constituted a prohibited state involvement in private class
discriminations. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black stated
that the fourteenth amendment does not dictate that an individual can be denied equal protection
of his property rights simply because his actions are motivated by racial prejudice. Id. at 318 (Black,
J., dissenting). See also Buchanan, supra note 156. The Court also decided Bowie v. City of Columbia, 375 U.S. 347 (1964), Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), and Thompson v.
City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). For a further discussion of all the 1964 Sit-In Cases, see
Paulsen, Te Sit-In Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 137.
184. 387 U.S. at 377. The Court further stated, "[h]ere we are dealing with a provision
which does not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was
intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market. The right
to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State." Id. at 380-81.
185. See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(state action based on state statute permitting proprietor of restaurant to refuse to serve persons
who are considered offensive to a major part of his customers) (Justice Stewart dissented in Reilman);
Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1956) (governmental action based on
federal legislation permitting, but not compelling, union shops); cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
at 384 (White, J., concurring) (state statute permitting racially discriminatory charitable trust is
basis for state action).
186. 387 U.S. at 381. There is no language in Shelley to show that the Court considered the
function served by the restrictive covenants was zoning. The Court in several places distinguished
Sheley from cases involving ordinances or other means used by the state to restrict the use of an
area. These restrictive covenants are not like zoning codes.
187. Id. at 384.
188. Id. at 385; see Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 163; infra text accompanying notes 209-27.
There is no difference, as I see it, between a State authorizing a licensee to practice
racial discrimination and a State, without any express authorization of that kind, nevertheless, launching and countenancing the operation of a licensing system in an environment
where the whole weight of the system is on the side of discrimination. In the latter situation,
the State is impliedly sanctioning what it may not do specifically.
387 U.S. at 385.
189. 387 U.S. at 385.
190. Id. at 386.
191. Id. at 385-86. Justice Douglas further stated that "[ujrban housing is in the public domain
as evidenced not only by the zoning problems presented but by the vast schemes of public financing
with which the States and the Nation have been extensively involved in recent years. Urban housing
is clearly marked with the public interest." Id. at 384.
192. Id. at 386.
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The overriding importance of public expectations underlies Justice Douglas'
public function/public interest analysis.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Black, Clark, and Stewart, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he reasoned that the pro tanto repeal of the California
anti-discrimination statutes by the new state constitutional provision was no
more a violation of the fourteenth amendment than if California had never
passed those statutes in the first place.' 93 Section 26 was merely the embodiment
of the state's policy to remain neutral,' 94 a choice the state was constitutionally
free to make. He disagreed with the Court's reliance on the California Supreme
Court's finding that the new state constitutional provision was tantamount to
active state encouragement of private racial discrimination because this had not
been a finding of fact.' 95 Rather, the California court's conclusion was a legal
96
conclusion of federal constitutional law.'
While Justice Harlan acknowledged that the adoption of new state constitutional provisions was state action, he asserted that the only issue before the
Court was whether that provision impermissibly deprived any person of equal
protection. 97 Only if the state required the discrimination would it be unconstitutional.' 9s Section 26, however, did not require governmental enforcement.'"
Justice Harlan warned that the Court's standard of "encouragement" would
have a slippery slope effect because "every act of private discrimination is either
forbidden by state law or permitted by it. There can be little doubt that such
permissiveness - whether by express constitutional, or statutory provision, or
implicit in common law - to some extent 'encourages' those who wish to
discriminate to do so."''(
Reitman, together with its analytical first cousin, Shelley, represents the most
expansive reading the Court has given to state action. However, from all indications, Reitman, at least, has been left to atrophy. 2"' Nevertheless, despite
Reitman's potentially limitless application to legislation repealing statutes that
had conferred rights or benefits beyond those constitutionally required, that
opinion's language does set forth some meaningful boundaries. The court formed
these boundaries by stressing the importance of legislative intent in the "milieu"
of the California housing market.2 0 2 In Reitman, the Court found the requisite
intent to authorize discrimination because of pre-existing public expectations
partly created by the repealed statutes and the circumstances surrounding the
housing market in California.

193.
194.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 387.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394.

201.
Phillips, supra note 7, at 695 n.58; McCoy, supra note 15 at 792. A similar fate has
befallen any attempt to read Shelley as holding that judicial enforcement of private actions automatically converts such action into that of the state.
202. 387 U.S. at 381.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss4/2

34

Schneider: State Action--Making Sense Out of Chaos--An Historical Approach

1985]

STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

The Reitman majority virtually ignored federalism since, theoretically, at least
in the absence of any pre-existing, anti-discrimination statutes, the state should
have been free to remain neutral with regard to private discrimination in the
housing market. Reitman was never expressly overruled. However, it now appears that state legislation merely permitting, rather than compelling, particular
discriminatory acts will not constitute state action, regardless of any contrary
public expectations.
In Adickes v. Kress,2 1 3 the Court's final state action decision before the commencement of the Burger Court retreat, a white plaintiff brought suit under
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.2 04 The defendant was a restaurant which
refused to serve the plaintiff while she was in the company of six of her young
black students. Upon her departure from the restaurant, a town policeman
arrested the plaintiff on a charge of vagrancy. Unlike the plaintiff, her students
were served by the defendant and were not arrested. The complaint had two
counts. The first alleged that the refusal to serve her deprived her of her rights
under the equal protection clause. The second count alleged that both the refusal
of service and her subsequent arrest were the product of a conspiracy between
the restaurant and the police to deprive her of her fourteenth amendment rights.
The lower courts directed a verdict for the defendant on the first count and
granted a summary judgment for thedefendant on the second count.
In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court began with the conspiracy
count. It held that a white plaintiff could demonstrate a violation- of her rights
under the fourteenth amendment by proving that an employee of the restaurant,
acting in the course of his employment, and a city policeman conspired to deny
the plaintiff service in the restaurant. Likewise, her rights were violated if they
conspired to arrest her because she was a white person in the company of
blacks.2 "5- The state Qfficial's involvement in such a conspiracy would satisfy the
2
state action requirement whether or not his actions were officially authorized. 111'
The private party involved in such a conspiracy was liable under section 1983
7
since he had willfully participated in joint activity with the state or its agents.21t
The public would reasonably expect that such joint conduct between the restaurant employee and the state official would subject the former as well as the
2 08
latter to the same constitutional limitations.
203. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
204. 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1982) provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
205. 398 U.S. at 150-52.

206.

Id.

207. Id.
208. After extensive examination of the legislative history of section 1983, the Court also held
that a private party acts under color of state law when his discrimination is motivated by the state
enforced custom of segregating the races in public eating places. Id. at 170-71, 173-74. Thus,
under count one, the restaurant's refusal to serve the plaintiff subjected it to liability under section
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The Twentieth Century Retreat

The re-emergence of the state action requirement as a restraint on federal
judicial power began in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 22 " The plaintiff, a black,
brought suit under section 1983 against both the local Moose Lodge, a branch
of a national fraternal organization, and the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority.
The employees of Moose Lodge had refused service to Irvis when he visited
the club as a guest of a club member. He claimed that this refusal was action
under color of state law, violating the equal protection clause, because the
Liquor Authority had licensed the club to sell liquor. This licensing subjected
the Lodge to state regulation. The plaintiff sought only injunctive relief which
would have revoked the Lodge's license so long as it continued discriminatory
practices.
The Court held that, with one exception, neither the licensing nor the
regulation of the club was sufficient to make the discriminatory guest policies
of Moose Lodge state action. 2 "' The Court acknowledged that "[wihile the
principle [that only action by the state is subject to constitutional restraint] is
easily stated; the question of whether particular discriminatory conduct is private, on the one hand, or amounts to 'state action', on the other hand, frequently admits of no easy answer.""' The Court rejected any argument that
discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be unconstitutional merely
because the private entity receives any service or benefit from the state or is
subject to some degree of state regulation.2 2 Rather, the Court used language

1983. The Court carefully examined the question of when a custom acquires the force of law and
concluded that such a custom need not necessarily be enforced by a state statute. Id. at 171-72.
Also, the custom need not have state-wide application. However, it must involve settled practices
of state officials. A custom can have the force of law and thus subject a private entity whose actions
are motivated by it to the fourteenth amendment, even though it lacks state-wide application, in
the same way that a town ordinance, which obviously lacks state-wide application, can offend the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 167-68, 173. Such settled practices "may, by imposing sanctions or
withholding benefits, transform private predictions into compulsory rules of behavior no less than
legislative pronouncements." Id. at 168. Justice Brennan joined the majority opinion in its conclusion with regard to its conspiracy analysis. The basis of his disagreement with the decision,
however, concerned the plaintiff's alternative argument that the defendant restaurant's discrimination
was authorized and encouraged by state statutes. Id. at 190 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan's observation at the outset of his opinion that any significant state involvement in racial
discrimination is unconstitutional, "however subtle and indirect" such involvement may be and
"whatever form it may have taken" is indicative of a complete transformation from the approach
of the earlier cases requiring direct state action. Id. at 190-91 (Brennan, J.. dissenting) (emphasis
added). The basis of Justice Brennan's dissent focused on what he perceived to be an unduly
limiting application of the holdings in the Court's previous decisions in the Sit-In Cases. justice
Black concurred in the case, expressing concern over what he believed was the district court's
improper denial of the right to have the jury determine the issues involved in the case. Id. at 175
(Black, J., concurring). See supra note 183.
209. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
210. The Court held that the plaintiff only had standing to challenge the club's policies with
regard to guests and not with regard to membership policies. Id. at 166-71.
211.
Id. at 172.
212. Id. at 173. As I have already noted, the Court, in the earlier Pollak decision, had rejected
a challenge to a licensed and regulated transit company's broadcast of radio programs inside its
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from Reitman that required "significant" state involvement with the discrimination to constitute state action, as a means to restrict rather than expand the
21 3
applicability of constitutional limitations.
The Court returned to the theoretical eclecticism of Burton, although this
time it did not find state action. First, the Court held that the state had neither
commanded nor encouraged the discrimination.2 1 4 The Court contrasted the
extensive interdependence between the private restaurant and the public parking
authority in Burton with the situation in Moose Lodge. The Court held that no
symbiotic relationship 2 5 existed between the Liquor Control Board and Moose
Lodge. The numerous indicia of state action present in Burton were absent in
Moose Lodge. Unlike the Eagle Coffee Shop in Burton, the Moose Lodge was
located on privately owned land and expressly proclaimed that it was not open
to the public. 2 6 Nor had the Lodge "discharge[d] a function or perform[ed]
' 217
a service that would otherwise in all likelihood be performed by the State.
Nor did the state's regulation of the club under its licensing process render the
21
state a partner in the club's operation. 1
The only aspect of the Authority's regulatory enforcement scheme that disturbed the Court was its requirement that "[e]very club licensee [shall] adhere
to all of the provisions of its Constitution and By-Laws. 2' 9 Since the Lodge's
racially discriminatory policies were now part of the club's by-laws, 22' the Court
concluded that the regulation must be enjoined, since, citing Shelley, "the application of state sanctions to enforce such a rule would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment." 2 2' The Court now appeared to draw a definite line between
passive legislation, which merely permitted but neither encouraged nor compelled particular discriminatory acts and legislation that affirmatively enforced

buses. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20. It is not clear from the opinion, however, whether
the majority merely assumed, arguendo, the presence of state action in the practices of a regulated
industry since the Court held that the company's practice did not violate the Constitution even if
it constituted governmental action. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNC, supra note 124, at 525
n.5; see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356 n.16 (1974); infra text accompanying notes 225-42.
213. The Court held that the state must have "significantly involved itself with invidious
discriminations." 407 U.S. at 173 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)).
214. 407 U.S. at 173. The Court cited Peterson v.City of Greenville as support for this conclusion.
407 U.S. at 173 (citing Peterson, 373 U.S. at 248). As I have already stated, supra note 183, the
Court in Peterson held that the ostensibly private initiative of a trespass prosecution was proscribed
because the existence of a local ordinance requiring segregation was equivalent to the state commanding the result.
215. 407 U.S. at 174-75.
216. Id. at 175.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 177.
219. Id. (quoting Pa. Liquor Control Bd. Reg. 5 113.09 (1970)).
220. Id. at 177. At the time of trial, the Lodge's constitution only contained discriminatory
policies with regard to membership. The by-laws were altered between the trial and hearing before
the Supreme Court to include discriminatory guest policies as well. Id. at 178.
221. Id. at 179. The Court reiterated that state action for fourteenth amendment purposes
"may emanate from rulings of administrative and regulatory agencies as well as from legislative
or judicial action." Id. (citing Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964)).
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or commanded such discrimination. Only the latter would now be subject to
constitutional scrutiny.
Moose Lodge held that the regulation or licensing of a private entity by the
government would not transform all actions taken by that private entity into
state action. However, the Court carefully sidestepped the question of whether
the conferral of a monopoly on a private entity would convert its actions into
those of the state. That issue awaited resolution until Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co. 222 For the time being, the Court merely held that the availability of
liquor from licensees other than clubs precluded the need to decide the issue."'
Although public expectations were not expressly discounted in Moose Lodge,
their importance to the state action determination were markedly diminished
from the zenith reached in the decisions of the Vinson and Warren Courts,
notably Marsh, Burton and Reitman. The fulfillment of public expectations was
being supplanted as a doctrinal objective. The Court increasingly desired to
establish a zone of activity engaged in by private actors that would be free
from federal judicial scrutiny, despite partial governmental controls in the form
2 24
of licensing, funding, or both..
The pace of the state action retreat quickened with the Court's decision in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,22" decided two years after Moose Lodge. The
plaintiff in Jackson brought an action under section 1983 against a privatelyowned utility claiming that the utility's termination of her service without a
hearing violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The utility
held a certificate of public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, and was subject to extensive regulation by that Commission."
The termination of service was carried out pursuant to a provision of the utility's
general tariff, filed with the Commission. This tariff provided that Metropolitan
had the right to discontinue service to any customer on reasonable notice of
nonpayment of bills. 22 ' The issue was whether Metropolitan's termination for
nonpayment under this provision of the general tariff constituted state action.
Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
22 8
no state action.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court, held that the utility's actions were not state action and affirmed the lower courts. The decision
furthered the restrictive trend begun in Moose Lodge in four major ways, making
Jackson perhaps the most significant state action decision of the Burger Court's
retreat from the expansive state action concept of its predecessors. First, having
concluded that extensive regulation of the utility in general by the Commission
222.
223.

419 U.S. 345 (1974). But see 407 U.S. at 181-183 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
407 U.S. at 177.

224. See Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of
Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980"s, 21 B.C. L. REv. 763 (1980). This increasing
adherence to support for federalism as an objective of judicial philosophy is evident as well in areas
other than state action.

225.

419 U.S. 345 (1974).

226.

Id. at 346.

227.

Id.

228.

Id. at 349.
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did not transform the actions of Metropolitan into state action, 229 the Court
held that "the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' ' 23" The
Court went on to conclude that even if the state had conferred monopoly status
on the utility, the requisite nexus between the challenged termination procedure
and the governmental action in creating and maintaining such a monopoly was
absent.2 3 ' The thrust of the decision indicates that any regulation or other nexus
between the state and the challenged activity must, indeed, be quite close.
Second, the nexus test, as articulated in Jackson, was based on examining
the claimant's various state action arguments seriatim rather than in the aggregate. The Court considered and then rejected each factor or argument individually as being insufficient to establish state action, despite "lip-service' '2-2
to examining the arguments "taken together. ' 233 Such a narrow focus would
implicitly diminish the importance of public expectations of constitutional protection. Arguably, Jackson implicitly overruled that aspect of Burton that had
indicated that various indicia of state action should be evaluated in the aggregate.
That the Court's nexus test and seriatim approach to state action had forced
an implicit disavowal of any concern for public expectations is demonstrated
best by the dissenting opinions in Jackson. Justice Marshall's dissent in Jackson
questioned the validity of the nexus analysis of the majority because it focused
solely on the connection between the state and the particular conduct challenged
by the plaintiff rather than upon the extensive interaction between the utility
and the state. 234 He argued that in cases where the state's only significant
involvement with the private entity is through funding or limited regulation,
such narrow scrutiny may be appropriate. However, a different examination
would be appropriate when, as in the instant case, the state had insinuated
itself so thoroughly into the operations of the private entity. 35 Additionally,
Justice Marshall emphasized the importance of the utility's monopoly status.
He maintained that even where the Court had not found state action on the
sole basis of the conference of a monopoly, nevertheless, it had suggested that
the monopoly factor weighed heavily in determining whether formally private
26
entities should be subject to constitutional limitations. 3
The majority's seriatim approach deeply disturbed Justice Douglas who, in
a persuasive dissent, 237 argued that the Court's precedent required more than

229.
230.
231.

The Court relied on Moose Lodge and Pollak to support this conclusion.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.

232. This characterization was made by Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 362
(Douglas, .J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 358.
234. Id. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 369-70.
236. Id. at 367. Justice Marshall's criticism of the seriatim approach subsequently reappeared
in his incisive dissent in Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 844.
237. 419 U.S. at 359.
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the majority's token attention to the totality of the state's involvement with
the utility. He asserted that it was "the aggregate that is controlling." 2 Public
expectations cannot be thoroughly evaluated without consideration of the totality
of the relationship between the state and a private actor.
The third restriction imposed by Jackson concerning the scope of state action
involved the effect of state inaction. The Court held that the state's failure to
disapprove the utility's proposed tariff before it became effective was an insufficient basis to invoke the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment."'9 The
termination provision automatically became effective sixty days after it was filed
with the Public Utility Commission, unless expressly disapproved by the Commission.2 4"1Justice Rehnquist maintained that mere acquiescence or authorization
by the Commission was not enough to place the state's "imprimatur" on the
challenged action because the state had not "ordered" the termination procedure. The utility had merely exercised a choice allowed, but not mandated,
by state law. Thus, at least in the regulatory context, something more than
mere acquiescence would be necessary to sustain a finding of state action.
The fourth and perhaps most severe restriction on the scope of state action
imposed by Jackson concerned the definition of public function. The Court reduced the practical utility of the public function test in state action analysis.
The Court accomplished this reduction by requiring, for the first time, that a
function must be one that has not only been traditionally, but also exclusively
performed by the state in order to constitute state action.2 4 ' The Court concluded
that Metropolitan did not perform a public function since the utility was not
exercising powers "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.' '242 The Court
in Jackson rejected the argument that an activity became a public function for
purposes of state action merely because it "provides an essential public service."
The public function doctrine had grown as a response to the reasonable public
expectations that arose from the public nature of various activities. This exclusivity requirement now dramatically limited the scope of reasonableness with
regard to those expectations.
The Court's next major state action decision, however, transformed the
meaning of "exclusivity" itself. In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,2 4 ' the controversy

238.

Id. at 360.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 355.
241.
Id. at 352. But see Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Functizon" and "Power
Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 757.
242. 419 U.S. at 352.
243. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). A city marshall had arranged the storage in the Flagg Brothers'
warehouse after Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment. Brooks allowed her
belongings to be moved and stored even though she protested that the price for the services was
too high. Two months later, after a series of disputes regarding the charges, Flagg Brothers sent
a letter to Brooks in which they threatened to sell her furniture unless the payment was made
within ten days. Brooks and her attorneys failed in their subsequent efforts to resolve the dispute
before filing suit. Id. at 153. Several scholars have analyzed and commented on the state action
problem in Flagg. See, e.g., Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U.PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982); Rowe, The Emerging Threshold Approach to StateAction
Determinations: Tying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEo. L.J. 745 (1981).

239.
240.
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centered around the threatened sale of Shirley Brooks' possessions by the warehouseman who was storing them. Brooks brought a class action suit under
section 1983 against Flagg Brothers seeking damages, and an injunction against
the threatened sale. She also sought a declaration that the sale pursuant to New
York Uniform Commercial Code section 7-210244 would violate the due process
and equal protection clauses.2 45 The district court dismissed the action on the
ground that the warehouseman's conduct was not state action.2

46

The Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding
sufficient state involvement in the threatened sale to subject Flagg Brothers to
the limitations of the fourteenth amendment. The Court of Appeals relied on
the language of Jackson, which it believed had "suggested that state action might
be found in the exercise by a private party of 'some power delegated to it by
the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty.' ' 4 7 The Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals and found no state action. The Court
characterized the issue before it as "whether Flagg Brothers' action may fairly
be attributed to the State. ' 248 The Court did not, therefore, determine whether
the relevant U.C.C. provision alone was sufficient to support a constitutional
249
inquiry.
Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, began his analysis by
dividing a section 1983 action into "two separate areas of inquiry.' '25 First,
the plaintiff must show that the right deprived is "secured by the Constitution
and the laws' of the United States.' '251 Second, the defendant had to be acting
under color of state law.2 52 The right allegedly deprived was the right to be
free from the deprivation of property without due process.2 53 Since this fourteenth amendment right requires state action, the relevant inquiry under the
first element thus became whether Flagg Brothers' actions were properly attributable to the state. In concluding that their actions were not attributable
to New York, the Court first distinguished its earlier pre-judgment cases, beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. ,254 which had imposed procedural
limitations on creditors' remedies. Justice Rehnquist distinguished the earlier
cases on the basis of the present case's "total absence of overt official involvement. "255 Justice Rehnquist rejected the plaintiff's primary contention that state
244.
245.
246.
247.

N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210 (Consol. 1980).
436 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 154-55 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974),

aff'g 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973)).
248. 436 U.S. at 157.
249. See infra note 256.
250.

436 U.S. at 155-56 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)).

251.
252.
253.

436 U.S. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 156.

254.

395 U.S. 337 (1969).

255. 436 U.S. at 157. In contrast to this position, Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the
very defect that made the statutes in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and in North Georgia
Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) unconstitutional, namely the lack of state control, was
the same factor that precluded constitutional review by the majority in the present case. 436 U.S.
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action was present because the state, by enacting section 7-210, had delegated
to Flagg Brothers the function of resolving private disputes on the basis that
the exclusivity requirement imposed by Jackson had not been satisfied."" After
analyzing Terry and Smith, as well as Marsh and its progeny, the Court articulated a new version of exclusivity - one significantly different from that
created in Jackson.
In Jackson, Justice Rehnquist had examined whether the function in question
had been traditionally an exclusive sovereign prerogative; that is, whether the
function had traditionally been one reserved solely to the government.2 7 Yet
in Flagg, by relying on the White Primary Cases and Marsh, Justice Rehnquist
evaluated exclusivity by determining whether the private actor provided the
exclusive means for exercising a particular constitutional right. "' The focus thus
shifted from the exclusivity of the sovereign's prerogative to the exclusivity of
the private actor's prerogative.2 59 Flagg looked not only to the nature of the
function, as Jackson did, but also to whether the particular defendant performed
the activity to the exclusion of others.
The proposed sale by Flagg Brothers under section 7-210 did not satisfy
the exclusivity requirement because it was "not the only means of resolving
this purely private dispute. ' 2 " The Court explained that "creditors and debtors
have had available to them historically a far wider number of choices" than
those available to the excluded blacks in the elections in Terry and Smith and to
the religious pamphleteer in Marsh.2 1' The Court acknowledged that certain

at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's holding as
"fundamentally inconsistent with, if not foreclosed by" the line of cases beginning with Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp. Id. at 169 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was "baffled" by the
majority's attempt to distinguish those cases from the one presently before the Court on the basis
that they involved "overt official involvement." Id. at 169 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He maintained
that the "overt official" action in those cases consisted of purely ministerial function performed
by "minor governmental functionaries." Id. at 173-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
contended that the majority's "suggestion" that this was the basis for due process review in Sniadach
and its progeny was an unwise expansion of the state action doctrine. Id. at 174 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He reasoned that the findings of state action in those cases instead reflected the "Court's
recognition of the significance of the State's role in defining and controlling the debtor-creditor
relationship. . . . The state statutes [in those cases] placed the state power to repossess property in
the hands of an interested private party, just as the state statute in this case places the state power
to conduct judicially binding sales in satisfaction of a lien in the hands of the warehouseman."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
256. Id. at 157-58. Professor Tribe maintains that the state statute involved, UCC section 7210, was only present in the background of the case. J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra
note 141, at 185-86. That rule was not challenged. Only the action of the creditor was challenged.
The Court would have ruled upon the validity of the UCC provision had it been directly implicated
in the case. Id. at 186. Professor Tribe also concluded that Blum v. Yarelsky was decided the way
it was, despite positive encouragement by state and federal funding rules because those rules were
not before the Court, "they are just background." Id. at 188. See infra text accompanying notes
291-95.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

436 U.S. at 157-64.
Id. at 157-60.
Id. at 157-64. See also Boest, supra note 243, at 1327.
436 U.S. at 160.
Id. at 162.
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functions, such as education, fire and police protection, and tax collection, were
"not covered by [the Court's] election cases or governed by the reasoning of
263
Marsh' 262 and "have been administered with a greater degree of exclusivity"
by the state than the function of dispute resolution involved in Fagg.264 However,

the Court explicitly refused to express the extent, if any, to which a state could
avoid the strictures of the fourteenth amendment by delegating to private parties
the performance of such functions.

265

Justice Stevens' dissent was harshly critical of the majority's new exclusivity
formulation:
As I understand the Court's notion of "exclusivity", the sovereign
function here is not exclusive because there may be other state remedies,
under different statutes or common-law theories, available to respondents ....

Even if I were to accept the notion that sovereign functions

must be "exclusive," the Court's description of exclusivity is incomprehensible. The question is whether a particular action is a uniquely
sovereign function, not whether state law forecloses any possibility of
recovering for damages for such activity ....

[The majority's] analysis

is not based on "exclusivity", but on some vague, and highly inappropriate, notion that respondents should not complain about this state statute if the State offers them a glimmer of hope of redeeming their
possessions,
or at least the value of the goods, through some other state
2
action.

66

Justice Stevens' dissent thus clearly pointed out the ambiguity resulting from
the Court's shift in focus in defining exclusivity. Noting that "it is no longer
possible, if it ever was, to believe that a sharp line can be drawn between
private and public actions," Justice Stevens' dissent closed by recognizing the
importance of public expectations. "[W]e expect government 'to provide a reasonable and fair framework of rules which facilitate commercial tranactions'
[which] is premised on the assumption that the State will control nonconsensual
deprivations of property and that the State's control will, in turn, be subject
to the restrictions of the Due Process Clause.' '267 Justice Stevens condemned
the majority's decision that allowed the state to divide power from responsibility
by the "simple expedient of transferring the implementation of its policy to
private parties." Such a division is impermissible under the fourteenth amendment. 268 Moreover, with its new emphasis on the importance of its own brand
of exclusivity, the majority of the Court had overlooked the significance of
269
public expectations in defining a public function.
262.

Id. at 163.

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 163-64. The Court subsequently declined to take advantage of this opening for
doctrinal change or modification in its 1982 state action trilogy. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457

U.S. 830 (1982); cf. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
266.
267.

436 U.S. at I'2 n.8 (citation omitted).
Id. at 178 (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 624 (Powell, J., concurring)).

268. Id. at 179. •
269. In discounting the Court's fear that finding state action in the instant case would convert
all private deprivations of property into state action "whenever the State, for whatever reason,
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The Flagg Brothers majority, relying, in part, on Jackson,27' Moose Lodge,17 1
Adickes, 272 and Newton v. Abney, 2 1 3 concluded by rejecting the notion that the
state's mere acquiescence in or authorization of a private action converts that
action into state action. 274 The Flagg Brothers' proposed sale was not state action
since section 7-210 merely permitted rather than compelled the threatened action.
The statute merely set forth those circumstances under which the state would
not interfere with a private sale. 275 The permissive/compulsory dichotomy would
be an effective mechanism for reducing the scope of reasonable public expectations of constitutional protections.
Any interest in further restricting the contours of state action remained
dormant until the 1981 Supreme Court Term. In the earlier part of that term,
the Court announced Polk v. Dodson, 276 in which it held that a public defender
did not act under color of state law when she represented a criminal defendant. 27 7 The public defender, therefore, would not be liable to her client under
section 1983. The Court thus rejected the argument that the public defender's
employment relationship with the state, rather than the function she performed,
should determine the state action question. 278 The Court distinguished two pre-

denies relief sought by the putative property owner," Justice Stevens stressed that the focus must
be on the state's authorization and not the private party's deprivation. 436 U.S. at 176. Justice
Marshall's discent implicitly criticized Justice Rehnquist's shifting focus in defining exclusivity from
functions historically performed by the state to activities which the defendant performed in any
given case to the exclusion of others. He condemned the majority's "cavalier" treatment of the
place of historical factors in the state action inquiry. He stressed that the traditionality aspect of
the public function test could not be ignored and could not be "resolved in a historical vacuum"
and cited numerous cases from New York's courts, other state courts, and federal appellate courts
which had held that the function at issue was a traditional function of the state. 436 U.S. at 16768 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
270. The Court quoted from Jackson:
Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where
the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering
it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission
into "state action."
Id. at 164 (emphasis added) (quoting 419 U.S. at 357).
271. The Court drew a sharp distinction between that part of the decision in Moose Lodge
which found no state action in the state's failure to prevent the voluntary discrimination by a
private club with that part of the same decision which held that the state could not, by law,
affirmatively require the club to comply with its own discriminatory rules. Id.
272. The Court quoted from Adickes: "Our cases state 'that a State is responsible for the ...
act of a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.' This Court, however,
has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that
of the State." Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 398 U.S. at 170).
273. The majority in Flagg cited the Abney Court's refusal to find state action despite the
position taken in Abney by Justice Brennan in dissent that "a Georgia statutory provision authorizing
the establishment of trusts for racially restricted parks conferred a 'special power' on testators taking
advantage of the provision." Id. at 165 (citing Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 458 (1970) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)). Justice Brennan took no part in the Flagg decision. Id. at 166.
274. Id. at 164-66.
275. Id. at 165-66.
276. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
277. Id. at 317-25.
278. Id. at 319-24.
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vious cases that had subjected physicians employed by the state to liability under
section 1983.279 In contrast to those previous cases, the Court stressed that the

public defender's professional responsibility mandated her exercise of independent judgment on behalf of her client, rather than making her amenable
to administrative direction in the same sense as other employees of the state.
The defender thus performed essentially a private function 280 and, therefore, did
not act under color of state law.
Polk's importance as a harbinger of any specific type of restriction on the
scope of state action is somewhat suspect since even Justices Marshall and
Brennan joined the majority in the eight to one decision. 28' The case is actually
a curious departure from the Burger Court's general disinclination to consider
public expectations in resolving the state action problem. Although never expressly stated, the Court's conclusion as to the private nature of the public
defender's function is quite consistent with the public's reasonable expectations.
To conclude otherwise could arguably mean that both the defendant and the
prosecution were represented by the same party, a highly undesirable result.
The majority's decision may have been motivated primarily by a desire to
282
protect public defenders from frivolous suits by dissatisfied clients.
The Court's most recent pronouncements on state action, a trilogy of cases
announced on the same day in June, 1982, continue to reflect the Burger
Court's overriding concern for protecting and promoting federalism and an area
of individual choice relatively free from constitutional restraints. Similarly, they
indicate a declining interest in utilizing public expectations as a basis for delineating the state action doctrine. Two of the three decisions did not find state

279.

One case was O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), which held that a state

cannot constitutionally confine as a mental patient a non-dangerous individual who is capable of
survival by himself or with help of friends. The other case was Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976), which held that deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's serious injury
or illness constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
280. At least one commentator has asserted that Polk may indicate an emergence of a so-called
"private function" doctrine in state action analysis. Phillips, supra note 7, at 710. Such a doctrine
would effectively "deconstitutionalize formally public activity .because of its functional resemblance to
private behavior." Id. (emphasis in original). "Specifically, if formally private" bodies can be subjected to constitutional checks because the functions they perform are essentially public, why cannot
formally public actors be released from such checks if their operations are deemed intrinsically
private?" Id. at 711. Such an approach would be consistent with the Burger Court's recent tendency
to limit the reach of state action. Professor Tribe has used a similar theme in analyzing several
Supreme Court decisions.
The Court now appears to be shrinking the constitutional protection for free speech that
is available against manifestly and indisputably governmental action - by analogizing what
the government does in various spheres to what private economic actors might be allowed
to do as philanthropists or as employers. Not only is the Court seeing less clearly the
public power behind private force; it is, in addition, envisioning public force as though
it were merely private because it sometimes acts in a way that we are accustomed to
associate with private actors.
J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 225.
281. Phillips, supra note 7, at 713.
282. Id. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 337-38 (Blackmum, J. dissenting); see also
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984).
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action, defining the activity under scrutiny very narrowly so as to eliminate or
at least reduce the relevance of public expectations in resolving the state action
question. The only decision of the three finding state action, Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co.,2 s 3 is a very limited aberration from the Court's overall retreat from
the expansive state action decisions of the Vinson and Warren Courts.
In Lugar, a debtor brought an action under section 1983 against a creditor
who had obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment of the debtor's property.
The writ had been issued by a clerk of the state court upon a creditor's ex
parte petition asserting that the debtor was disposing of or might dispose of
his property in order to defeat his creditors. The county sheriff executed the
writ. The entire attachment procedure was authorized by state statute.2 14 Subsequent to the attachment, a state trial judge invalidated the attachment on the
ground that the creditor had not established the statutory grounds for it as
alleged in the ex parte petition. The debtor sued the creditor for the damages
for the financial loss resulting from the attachment. The Supreme Court held
that a valid section 1983 cause of action was presented since the creditor acted
under color of "state law by invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage
of state created attachment procedures." 285 The Supreme Court expressly limited
its finding of state action in Lugar to a specific type of situation, namely "the
particular context of prejudgment attachment.' '286 More generally, however, the
decision may well herald a return to an earlier, more restrictive state action
concept, which required a showing of direct action by a governmental actor.
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, :'87 the Court rejected the due process claims of
professional personnel dismissed by an ostensibly private school since state action
was lacking. The school was providing statutorily mandated special education
that the state itself would have otherwise been obligated to provide directly.
The state extensively funded and regulated the school's educational program.
Likening the school to any other business entity that contracts with the government to perform services or build bridges or submarines,18 the Court concluded there was no state action involved in the school's terminations. The
Court discounted the state's role in funding and regulating the school as a
means by themselves of establishing state action. Any nexus between the school
and the state established by the funding or regulation related to the students
and the school's educational program, not to its personnel decisions.2 8 9 Nor was
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

457
Id.
Id.
Id.
457

U.S. 922 (1982).
at 924.

at 942.
at 939 n.21.
U.S. 830 (1982).

288. Justice Marshall was disturbed by the Court's failure to recognize the relevance of the
duty imposed upon the state by Chapter 766, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. I 71B, § 3 (West Supp.
1981) to provide the education, a function it then delegated to the private school. Id. at 850-51
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
289. According to Justice Marshall, the majority in Rendell-Baker ignored the Court's own
precedent which "emphasized the close relationship between teachers' free speech and the educational process." Id. at 850 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs in Rendell-Baker allegedly
had been dismissed for disagreeing with the school's "specific view of the sort of education that
should be provided under the statute." Id. at 850 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "The State, by refusing
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the school performing a public function since the provision of education had
29
never been an exclusive prerogative of the state. 0
The Court completely ignored the fact that the existence of this statutorily
created obligation imposed upon the state would justifiably lead the public to
reasonably expect that the provision of such education by the school on behalf
of the state would be done in a constitutional fashion. Instead, the Court used
the exclusivity requirement, as it had in Jackson, as a means of severely restricting the state action concept. The absence of such exclusivity demonstrated
to the Court the need for a zone of freedom to allow the private sector to
experiment without the threat of constitutional limitations. Without acknowledging that the school was operating as a surrogate for the state in carrying
out the state's own statutory obligation, the Court concluded that the school
should be free from the restrictions of the Constitution. The school should not
be scrutinized by the federal judiciary since there was no nexus or symbiotic
relationship with the state, nor public function that the school was performing
in dismissing the plaintiffs.
In Blum v. Yaretsky, 29' the other decision in the trilogy that did not find
state action, recipients of Medicaid benefits challenged the constitutionality of
their transfer by one nursing home to another facility 292 providing a lower level
of care. As a result, the plaintiffs' level of Medicaid benefits was reduced
proportionately. The Court emphasized that the plaintiffs, in suing two state
social service agencies, 293 challenged only the transfers themselves, not any particular state procedures, nor the actual subsequent reduction in benefits. 294 The
state bore no duty, statutory or otherwise, to provide nursing care - merely
an obligation to fund such services. The guarantees of the fourteenth amendment
were not applicable to the transfer decision. The federal judiciary could not
interfere in an area in which the state had chosen to impose no obligatory
provision of services in the first instance. Federalism dictated that this choice
was one free from the restrictions of the federal constitution. That the public
might expect nursing homes' transfer decisions which resulted in the redfiction
of state Medicaid benefits to be subject to constitutional limitations was virtually
ignored by the Court. Instead, the Court carefully bifurcated the issue of funding nursing services from that of providing the services. That the funding decision was the result of the transfer decision did not make the funding decision
responsible for the transfer. Unlike the reasoning used in the Court's decisions
during the Vinson and Warren eras, notably Burton and Marsh, the Court was
unwilling to acknowledge the cumulative impact that the overall connections
between the private entity's provision of nursing home services and the state's

to intervene, has effectively endorsed that view of its duties under Chapter 766." Id. Justice Marshall
therefore rejected the majority's conclusion that the actions at issue here were personnel decisions
and not educational decisions direcdy affecting the students. Id. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 842.
291. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
1
292. Id. at 993.
293. No private entities or persons were named as defendants.
294 457 U.S. at 1003.
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provision of funding and regulation would have upon public expectations of
constitutional protection in the nursing homes' transfer decisionmaking process.
Public expectations were also ignored by the majority in its refusal to recognize the purpose of the two-tiered system of nursing home care. The transfers
were mandated to reduce the Medicaid expenditures, a point emphasized by
the dissent.29 This tunnel-like focus was also evident in Rendell-Baker where the
Court failed to acknowledge the connection, with regard to function and public
expectations, between the educational services mandated by statute and the
teacher-plaintiffs themselves .296
Both Rendell-Baker and Blum indicate the Court's continuing philosophical
commitment to limiting the scope of activities subject to constitutional restrictions. In addition, the Court has reduced the relevance and importance of public
expectations of constitutional protection. The relative importance of state action
doctrinal objectives has therefore come full circle since the Court's nineteenth
century decisions in the Civil Rights Cases.
III.

CONCLUSION

By examining all the major state action cases in historical perspective, a
clear pattern of expansion and contraction emerges with regard to the scope of
the state action concept. This pattern is explainable, in large measure, by the
varying importance attributed to two different doctrinal objectives - federalism
and the fulfillment of public expectations that certain activities will be performed
within the limits of constitutional guarantees. Despite the Burger Court's tremendous change in the scope of the state action concept from that of its immediate predecessors, this Court has not expressly overruled the earlier decisions.
Viewing the state action cases in this historical context delineates the factors
that have caused the doctrinal expansion and contraction, thereby eliminating
the need to search for some mythical theoretical consistency among the decisions.
The result is a more honest and direct appraisal of the Court's present and
future course in determining what action is state action.
295.

Id. at 1015 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

296.

See supra note 289; Schneider, supra note 5.
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